NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, Volume 18 by Annette Vissing-Jorgensen
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from
the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003,
Volume 18
Volume Author/Editor: Mark Gertler and Kenneth
Rogoff, editors
Volume Publisher: The MIT Press
Volume ISBN: 0-262-07253-X
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/gert04-1
Conference Date: April 4-5, 2003
Publication Date: July 2004
Title: Perspectives on Behavioral Finance: Does "Irrationality"




KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY, NBER, AND CEPR
Perspectives on Behavioral
Finance: Does "Irrationality"
Disappear with Wealth? Evidence
from Expectations and Actions
1. Introduction
The contributions of behavioral finance are many. The field:
1. Documents price patterns that seem inconsistent with traditional
finance models of efficient markets and rational investors.
2. Documents behaviors by investors that seem inconsistent with the
advice of traditional finance theory.
3. Provides new theories for these patterns and behaviors, often based on
behaviors documented in the psychology literature or observed in
experiments.
4. Argues that if prices deviate from fundamentals due to the behavior of
irrational investors, arbitrage by rational investors may not be able to
force prices back to fundamentals. This part of the behavioral finance
literature is referred to as the limits to arbitrage literature.
The most influential work on price patterns within the behavioral finance
literature has concerned initial underreaction and (in some cases) subse-
quent overreaction of prices to new information. This work is described
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in Shleifer (2000) as well as in recent surveys of behavioral finance by
(insiders) Barberis and Thaler (2003); Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002);
and Hirshleifer (2001).
Defenders of the standard rational expectations, efficient markets asset
pricing approach have argued that the evidence on underreaction and
overreaction is unconvincing because (a) there are as many cases of initial
overreaction as initial underreaction, and the evidence is not that solid
statistically (Fama, 1998), and (b) if the documented price predictability
was statistically solid and stable over time, mutual fund managers should
be able to outperform the market substantially, on average, but are not
(Rubinstein, 2001). On the modeling side, many have found references to
the psychology literature or the experimental literature unconvincing. In
some cases, it seems that too much is possible, in the sense that the litera-
ture provides evidence both in favor of a given behavioral bias as well as
for the opposite bias. Furthermore, many have been skeptical of whether
behavioral biases are present in real-world cases where individuals have
had time to learn (by themselves or from prior generations), and in par-
ticular whether the wealthiest investors with large amounts at stake
exhibit behavioral biases. The behavioral side has defended itself by argu-
ing that prices may be far from the predictions of standard models even if
(risk-adjusted) profit opportunities are not present. This is the case
because arbitrage is limited. First, the mispricing may get worse in the
short run (noise trader risk). This is especially a problem when invest-
ment is delegated to portfolio managers with short investment horizons
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Second, arbitrage is risky when it involves the
whole stock market or when it involves individual stocks with no close
substitutes. Third, arbitrage may involve substantial transactions costs or
be hindered by costs of snorting stocks or restrictions on shorting stocks
(e.g., by mutual funds). Barberis and Thaler (2003) provide a discussion of
these limits to arbitrage. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2001, 2002) provide an
additional argument for limited arbitrage. They show theoretically that
it may be optimal for rational arbitrageurs to ride bubbles started by other
investors.
1
In this paper, I argue that direct evidence on investor beliefs and actions
is valuable for determining whether assumptions made in behavioral
asset pricing models are valid, and thus for determining which (if any) of
the models are convincing explanations of the facts they set out to explain.
Furthermore, to understand the causes of nonstandard beliefs and/or
1. In support of this theory, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2002) show that hedge fund portfolios
were tilted heavily toward technology stocks during the stock-market boom of the late
1990s and that hedge funds started to reduce their exposure in the quarter prior to the
price peaks of individual technology stocks.Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 141
actions, it is useful to distinguish between beliefs and actions that are
present for wealthy investors and thus unlikely to be due to information
or transactions costs, and beliefs and actions that are observed predomi-
nantly among less wealthy investors. This is also informative for deter-
mining whether a given bias is likely to have a substantial pricing impact.
It is important to emphasize that biases affecting mostly low-wealth
investors are nonetheless also important because these biases may have
large effects on the utility of these investors.
I start in Section 2 by discussing the types of evidence about investors
that would be valuable for understanding pricing anomalies. In Section 3
I provide new evidence on investor beliefs based on a dataset covering the
period 1998-2002. Section 4 then turns to a set of investor behaviors that
are inconsistent with the recommendations of standard finance theory
and reviews evidence on whether these biases diminish substantially with
investor wealth. Section 5 provides a rough calculation of how large infor-
mation and transactions costs would be needed to explain one particular
type of seemingly irrational investor behavior: limited participation in
stock markets. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Value of Direct Evidence on Investor Beliefs
and Actions
At the aggregate level, stock returns are predictable by the dividend-
to-price ratio, the earnings-to-price ratio, the market-to-book ratio, the con-
sumption-to-wealth ratio, and a host of other aggregate variables (see
Campbell [2000] for a list of references). The direction of predictability indi-
cates that future stock returns tend to be lower when the stock price is high
relative to dividends and earnings. Within a rational agent framework, the
interpretation of this is that investors' expected (and required) returns are
low at such times. The alternative theory proposed by behavioral finance is
overreaction of stock prices to news at the level of the aggregate stock mar-
ket. According to overreaction theories, the returns expected by market par-
ticipants are not unusually low when the price-to-dividend ratio is high.
The literature on the cross section of stock returns has identified many
return patterns not predicted by standard models. Examples of overreac-
tion include: (1) the market-to-book effect (low market-to-book or low
price-to-dividend stocks have historically outperformed high market-
to-book stocks [Fama and French, 1992, and earlier references cited
therein]), (2) the small firm effect (small stocks have outperformed large
stocks [Banz, 1981]), (3) long-run reversal (winners in the past three years
perform worse than past three year losers over the following three years
[DeBondt and Thaler, 1985]), and (4) the poor long-run performance of the142 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
stock of firms issuing new stock (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Examples of
underreaction include: (1) momentum (winners from the past 3 to 12
months continue to outperform losers from the past 3 to 12 months dur-
ing the following six months (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), and (2) the
post-earnings announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas, 1989).
Several risk-based models have been proposed for the cross-sectional
return patterns. Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) provide a rational model
based on growth options and time-varying risk that generates the market-
to-book effect, the size effect, and the momentum effect. Gomes, Kogan,
and Zhang (2003) provide a related investment-based explanation of the
market-to-book effect and the size effect.
The behavioral finance literature also provides several possible expla-
nations. In Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), earnings are generated by
a random walk process. However, investors think that shocks to earnings
either are negatively correlated (regime 1) or positively correlated (regime 2).
Investors update their beliefs based on observed earnings. Regime 1 is
motivated by experimental evidence that people overweight their prior
(conservatism), while regime 2 is based on experimental evidence that
people believe in a law of small numbers (that is, they expect even short
samples to reflect the population probabilities). The model generates
momentum, long-term reversal, and cross-sectional forecasting power for
scaled price ratios (i.e., initial underreaction followed by subsequent
overreaction). A related model based on the law of small numbers is
given in Rabin (2002). Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998)
provide an alternative model based on overconfidence in private signals
plus biased self-attribution. Overconfidence implies initial overreaction
of prices to private information, while biased self-attribution implies
that new public information supporting the investor's private informa-
tion leads to even more overconfidence. This, on average, leads to fur-
ther overreaction. The model thus explains medium-term momentum as
well as long-run reversals. A third model is that of Hong and Stein
(1999), in which two groups of agents interact to produce the same facts.
Private information diffuses slowly among news watchers who there-
fore generate initial underreaction. Momentum traders in turn generate
overreaction.
The above behavioral models base their main assumptions on experi-
mental evidence or simply assume certain trading strategies of investors.
They all rely on expectational errors of investors. To provide evidence on
whether the pricing anomalies reflect mispricing due to expectational
errors, a few papers have studied whether a large part of the profits from
value and momentum strategies occur at subsequent earnings announce-
ment dates (the following references are from Daniel, Hirshleifer, andPerspectives on Behavioral Finance • 143
Teoh [2002]). La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that
differences in postformation earnings announcement returns account for
about one-quarter of the value effect. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find
that during the first 7 months following the portfolio formation date a
similar fraction of the profits from their momentum strategies is due to
expectational errors. Jegadeesh (2000) shows that firms that issue sea-
soned equity do especially poorly around subsequent earnings announce-
ment dates.
While these findings are suggestive of some mispricing, they do not con-
clusively rule out the possibility that rational stories based on time-varying
expected returns could provide most of the explanation. They also do not
help sort among different behavioral explanations. Directly analyzing
investor expectations would be valuable. Several papers analyze measures
of expected returns of equity analysts (see Brav, Lehavy and Michaely
[2002] and references to earlier work therein). Careful modeling of analyst
incentives is needed to interpret such evidence because analyst forecasts
and the forecasts of professional macroeconomic forecasters have been
shown to depend on the incentives provided by existing payment schemes
(Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000; Lamont, 2002). Consistent with this,
Brav et al. (2002) find substantial differences between independent ana-
lysts and analysts with investment banking ties. For the independent
analysts, they find that expected returns are higher for small stocks, con-
sistent with the small-firm effect being a rational phenomenon driven by
risk, whereas book-to-market has little effect on expected returns and
momentum affects expected returns with the opposite sign of what a risk-
based explanation of the momentum effect would suggest.
Evidence on the beliefs of investors gets around any incentive problems
involved in interpreting analyst forecasts, and also does not need to
assume that investor beliefs are driven by or correlated with analyst fore-
casts. This turns out to be important because my evidence based on
investor beliefs suggests that investors' expected returns were high dur-
ing the last part of the stock-market boom in the late 1990s, which is the
opposite of what Brav et al. (2002) find for the independent analysts. The
data on investor beliefs also allows me to provide evidence regarding
some of the behavioral stories told to explain momentum and reversals.
Specifically I provide evidence in favor of a version of the law of small
numbers (an ingredient in the model of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny
[1998]) by analyzing the cross section of investor beliefs. I also find sup-
port for biased self-attribution (an ingredient in the model of Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam [1998]). I show that these biases are pres-
ent and fairly strong even for high-wealth investors and thus that some
pricing impact is likely.144 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
As an alternative to evidence based on beliefs, analysis of investment
patterns is informative for determining whether return puzzles are due
to mispricing or to time-varying risk and expected returns. Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2000) confirm that the momentum effect is present in
Finland and then analyze whether more sophisticated investors tend to
be more momentum oriented or less contrarian in their trades. They
find strong support for this, suggesting either that momentum repre-
sents mispricing and that this mispricing is better understood by more
sophisticated investors, or that high-momentum stocks are riskier in
some yet to be identified way and that more sophisticated investors are
better able to bear this risk. Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2002)
find that institutions buy shares from (sell shares to) individuals in
response to positive (negative) cash-flow news. Again, this has two
possible interpretations. Either institutions attempt to exploit under-
reaction of prices to earnings announcements, the post-earnings
announcement drift, or stocks with large positive (negative) earnings
surprises are by some measure riskier (less risky) than stocks with
small earnings surprises, and those who invest through institutions are
better able to bear high risk. In the context of both studies, the ideal evi-
dence would be a combination of these facts on trades, with evidence
on whether or not the expected returns of institutions and households
differed. If they did, that would provide further support for the mis-
pricing interpretation.
Before turning to the evidence on investor beliefs, it is important to
emphasize that the dataset I use covers only a short time period,
1998-2002, and mainly focuses on the aggregate stock market. While the
large price movements makes this period particularly interesting, I view
my results as simply suggestive. My evidence indicates that (1) expected
returns were high at the peak of the market; (2) many investors thought
the market was overvalued but would not correct quickly; (3) investors'
beliefs depend on their own investment experience (a version of the law
of small numbers); (4) the dependence of beliefs on own past portfolio
performance is asymmetric, consistent with theories of biased self-
attribution; and (5) investor beliefs do affect investors' stockholdings.
Mainly, the purpose of providing this evidence is to illustrate the value
that direct evidence on investor beliefs and actions can have in distin-
guishing rational theories of pricing anomalies from irrational ones, as
well as for testing the assumptions of behavioral models using data for
actual investors. While experimental evidence and references to the psy-
chology literature are suggestive, such evidence certainly is more con-
vincing if supplemented with facts about the beliefs and actions of
investors.Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 145
3. Investor Beliefs from 1998 to 2002
3.1 DATA
My study of investor beliefs is based on the household level data under-
lying the Index of Investor Optimism. Since 1996, UBS and Gallup have
conducted monthly telephone surveys of U.S. individual investors (an
international dimension was added starting in 2002). Until February 2003,
the UBS/Gallup data were proprietary. The data can now be purchased
via the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut. UBS granted me
access to the data in late 2002 so that I could undertake this study.
To be included in the survey, investors must have at least $10,000 in
household financial assets defined as "stocks, bonds, or mutual funds in
an investment account, or in a self-directed IRA or 401 (k) retirement
account." In 1996, about 1 in 3 households qualified as potential partici-
pants in the survey based on this criteria, increasing to about 4 in 10
households by the start of 2003. Using data from the 1998 Survey of
Consumer Finances, households with $10,000 or more in financial assets
owned more than 99% of stocks owned directly or indirectly by U.S.
households, more than 99% of household financial wealth, and about 95%
of household net worth.
The UBS Index of Investor Optimism is based on qualitative responses
to a series of questions about optimism or pessimism regarding the
investor's own investment and income outlook as well as about the stock
market and other macroeconomic variables. In this study I focus on the
more quantitative questions also included in the survey.
Each month about 1,000 investors are interviewed. The survey is not a
panel, but given the relatively large number of investors interviewed each
month, cohort analysis is possible. Information is collected about a host of
expectational and demographic variables. Four questions about returns
are of particular interest:
1. One-year own past return: "What was the overall percentage rate of
return you got on your portfolio in the past twelve months?"
2. Expected one-year own return: "What overall rate of return do you
expect to get on your portfolio in the next twelve months?"
3. Expected one-year market return: "Thinking about the stock market
more generally, what overall rate of return do you think the stock mar-
ket will provide investors during the coming twelve months?"
4. Expected ten-year market return: "And, what annual rate of return do you
think the stock market will provide investors over the next ten years?"
Information on these variables is available for June, September, and
December 1998, and then monthly from February 1999 to December 2002,146 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
with the exception that the expected ten-year market return is not asked
about in June 1998 and various months of 2002. For 1998 and 1999,
responses of less than 1% (including negative responses) are coded as one
category. I set these values to zero.
21 drop observations of expected mar-
ket or own portfolio returns and of own past portfolio returns that are
below -95% or above 95%.
31 supplement the answers to these questions
with background information on age, years of investing experience
("How long have you been investing in the financial markets?"), financial
wealth (categorical), and household income (categorical).
To determine if expectations affect investment decisions, I consider spe-
cial topical modules with information about portfolio shares (available for
September 1998, February 2001, and May 2001), and about Internet stock-
holdings and expectations (available for March, June, and September
1999, and February, April, June, and July 2000).
Finally, to analyze investors' perceptions about misvaluation of the
stock market and whether this is expected be corrected soon, I consider
three additional questions:
1. Overvaluation perception: "Do you think the stock market is overval-
ued/valued about right/undervalued, or are you unsure?"
4
2. Expected three-month market change: "Over the next three months, do
you think the stock market will go up, go down, or remain about the
same?"
3. Expected one-year market change: "A year from now, do you think the
stock market will be higher than it is now, lower, or about the same?"
The overvaluation perception is available for most months of the survey
since June 1998. The expected three-month market change is available
from December 1998 to August 2000, and the expected one-year market
change is available for September 1998 and from March 2000 onward.
3.2 WERE EXPECTED RETURNS HIGH IN THE LATE 1990s?
The UBS/Gallup data provide an opportunity to address several ques-
tions central to behavioral finance as well as traditional finance theory.
2. In the 1998 and 1999 data, fewer than 3% of responses for each of the four variables listed
are in the less-than-1% category, suggesting that the lack of negative values for these years
is not a substantial problem. To confirm this, I considered the data for January 2000, the
first month where zero and negative values are available in noncategorical form. The aver-
age expected market return calculated by setting responses of less than 1% to zero differed
by less than one-quarter percentage point from the value using the actual responses.
3. This approach was followed in some months in the data I received by Gallup. Also, it is
not clear how responses of 100% or above were coded before year 2000.
4. This question is one of the few where respondents explicitly are allowed an "unsure"
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I start by considering what the data from the recent stock-market experi-
ence can teach us about the reasons for predictability of aggregate stock
returns. If investors have rational expectations and understand the his-
torical relation between price-dividend ratios and future stock returns,
then their expected stock returns should be low during the last years of
the market boom when both price-dividend and price-earnings ratios
reached historical highs (and appropriate measures of risk should be low
at that time). On the contrary, if expected stock returns were high toward
the end of the market boom, this would lend support to behavioral sto-
ries of overreaction. Prior work on this issue includes Shiller, Kon-Ya,
and Tsutsui (1996), who used expectational data for institutional
investors in Japan to help analyze expectations at and after the peak of
the Nikkei index. Their results are hard to interpret. Japanese institu-
tional investors expected one-year capital gains on the Nikkei index of
about 10% at the peak of the market, which seems neither unusually high
or not unusually low, but expectations then increased to levels of around
20% after the first year and a half of the Nikkei's decline.
Using the UBS/Gallup data, Figure la shows average expected one-
year stock-market returns from June 1998 to December 2002. The graph
uses survey weights to make results representative of the population. For
reference, Figure lb and c shows the time series for the NASDAQ and
NYSE market indices.
The average expected one-year stock-market return increased from an
average of 11.8% in 1998 to 15.8% in January 2000, and then declined dra-
matically to around 6% at the end of 2002. Thus, expected returns were
high when the market was at its highest, counter to what the historical
statistical relation would have predicted. The correlation at the monthly
frequency between the average expected one-year stock-market return
and the level of the NYSE is 64.6, and the corresponding correlation with
the NASDAQ index is 78.0.
5 An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
(not shown) of the average expected one-year stock return on the NYSE
index results in a coefficient of 0.035 with t statistic of 5.9. Using the
NASDAQ index, the regression coefficient is 0.0024 with a t statistic of
8.6. Splitting the sample into investors with less than $100,000 in financial
assets and investors with $100,000 or more (not shown), the average
expected one-year stock returns are about 1% lower throughout the
period for those with $100,000 or more in financial assets, but the time
pattern is similar for the two groups.
This evidence suggests that, at least for this particular historical experi-
ence, prices and expected returns move together positively and thus that
5. These correlations are calculated using the NYSE and NASDAQ indices at the start of the
month. Survey interviews are conducted during the first two weeks of the month.Figure 1 AVERAGE EXPECTED ONE-YEAR AND TEN-YEAR STOCK MARKET
RETURNS, UBS/GALLUP DATA, AND THE LEVEL OF THE NYSE AND
NASDAQ INDICES 1998-2002










3 1999 2OOO 2OO1 2CX]
Year








2063Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 149
some amount of overreaction of prices may have been present.
6 The aver-
age expected ten-year stock-market returns, also shown in Figure 1, are
much more stable over time. Given the small number of ten-year periods
for which we have data, and the uncertainty about return predictability at this
frequency, stable beliefs at the ten-year horizon seem rational.
7 Graham
and Harvey (2001) study the stock-market return expectations of a smaller
sample of chief financial officers (CFOs) for six quarters, starting in the
second quarter of 2000. They also find that ten-year return expectations are
more stable than one-year return expectations and that one-year return
expectations move together positively with the realized market return.
3.3 DISAGREEMENT AND NOISE TRADER RISK
Standard finance theory suggests that expected stock-market returns should
be similar across investors. While some investors may have private informa-
tion about the returns on individual stocks, private information about the
return on the whole market is less likely. Furthermore, to the extent that
trading by better informed investors lead prices to reflect their informa-
tion, others can learn from prices (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), reducing
any belief heterogeneity further. In essence, because everyone, by
assumption, believes in the same model of how expected stock returns are
generated and are equally able to process information, any heterogeneity
in beliefs requires both that some investors have private information
about market returns and that noise traders or other impediments to
learning prevent prices from revealing this information to all investors.
Behavioral finance theory, on the other hand, suggests that differences
in expected returns across investors are likely. There is no presumption
that all investors use the same model to form expected stock-market
returns. Since Miller (1977), several models have considered the possible
equilibrium effects of disagreement, emphasizing that in the presence of
short-sales constraints, high disagreement leads to high prices and subse-
quent low returns. See Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) for refer-
ences to this literature and for empirical evidence in favor of this theory
based on analysts' earnings forecasts and the cross section of stock
returns. Less is known about disagreement concerning aggregate stock-
market returns and how investor beliefs begin to differ.
6. After completion of the final version of the paper I became aware that Fisher and Statman
(2002) use the aggregate UBS/Gallup averages to emphasize this feature of investor beliefs.
The following facts about investor beliefs exploit the household level UBS/Gallup data
and are thus more novel. The household level data also allows one to confirm that the pat-
tern shown in Figure l(a) is present even for high wealth investors.
7. The average expected ten-year market returns are surprisingly high, however, relative to
the average expected one-year market returns. Median ten-year return expectations also
exceed median one-year return expectations, although not quite as dramatically.150 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
Figure 2 CROSS-SECTIONAL STANDARD DEVIATION OF ONE-YEAR
EXPECTED STOCK RETURN (DISAGREEMENT), UBS/GALLUP DATA








The time series of cross-sectional standard deviations is shown in
Figure 2.
8 In a cross section of investors, it is likely that some of the
observed differences in responses for expected stock-market returns sim-
ply reflect lack of knowledge about stock-market returns, rather than
firmly held beliefs on which the investor would place substantial trades.
This is confirmed by the fact that the cross-sectional standard deviation of
expected one-year stock-market returns is 10.3% for all investors in the
sample compared to 9.2% for those with $100,000 or more in financial
assets, who have a greater incentive to be informed about returns. These
numbers are averages over time of the quarterly cross-sectional standard
deviations. Figure 2 therefore shows both the disagreement across all
investors as well as the disagreement among those with $100,000 or more
in financial assets. Consistent with the findings of Diether, Malloy, and
Scherbina (2002) for the cross section of stocks, disagreement was highest
just prior to the market decline. It is important to emphasize, however,
that finding a positive relation between disagreement and subsequent
returns does not necessarily reflect the importance of short sales constraints.
Did a significant number of investors in fact want to short the market in
the late 1990s? De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and
8. The figure uses a quarterly data frequency. Results are similar when monthly average
returns are subtracted before calculating the quarterly cross-sectional standard deviations.
Monthly cross-sectional standard deviations show the same patterns, but are a bit more
erratic, likely because a large number of observations is needed to estimate cross-sectional
standard deviations accurately.Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 151
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) emphasize how noise trader risk can limit arbi-
trageurs' willingness to take market-stabilizing positions. The risk that
misvaluation may worsen will lead rational arbitrageurs to bet less heav-
ily against the mispricing, more so the shorter the horizon of the arbi-
trageur. The argument of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) that it may even
be optimal for arbitrageurs to attempt to ride bubbles rather than bet
against them only serves to limit arbitrage further.
Shiller has collected expectations data that provide useful information on
this issue. His data cover U.S. institutional investors and U.S. individual
investors with net worth generally $250,000 or more.
9 While between 50
and 70% thought that U.S. stock prices were overvalued in 1998 and 1999
(calculated excluding those with "do not know" responses), about 70%
expected the Dow Jones Industrial index to increase over the next year.
Figure 3 provides related information for the UBS/Gallup data, which cov-
ers a broader sample of individual investors and does not include institu-
tions. As shown in Figure 3a, about 50% of investors thought the stock market
was overvalued during the last two years of the boom, and typically less than
10% thought it was undervalued. Despite this, Figure 3b shows that only
about 20% thought that the market would decline over the next three
months/one year. (I use the three-month horizon from December 1998 up to
February 2000, and the one-year horizon when it becomes available from
March 2000 onward and for September 1998.) As shown in Figure 3c, even
among those thinking the market was overvalued in 1999-2000, only about
25% thought it would decline. A similar pattern (not shown) is present for
investors with $100,000 or more in financial assets. Along with the evidence
on hedge fund holdings from Brunnermeier and Nagel (2002) mentioned
above, the expectations data support the idea that noise trader risk matters.
Of course, there is an identification problem here. Short sales con-
straints could be the reason that few thought the market would go down
in the near future. Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003, this volume) provide
an interesting study of disagreement about inflation expectations based
on data from the Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior (SCAB).
They find the same positive relation between the level of inflation and dis-
agreement about next year's inflation rate that is present for stock-market
returns. Since a high level of inflation is unrelated to short sales constraints
for stocks, it is possible that a positive relation between the level of a series
and the disagreement about the series in the future is a more general fea-
ture of expectations formation, for example, because households have less
history on which to base their expectations when the series is at an unusu-
ally high value.
9. Shiller's analysis is available at http://icf.som.yale.edu/confidence.index (accessed June
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3.4 THE DEPENDENCE OF INVESTOR BELIEFS ON THEIR OWN
INVESTMENT EXPERIENCE
A unique feature of the UBS/Gallup data is that they provide a host of infor-
mation about each individual investor in terms of demographics and past
portfolio performance. These data allow further analysis of differences in
beliefs. In this section I document that an investor's belief about future stock-
market returns depends on the investor's own experience measured by age,
years of investment experience, and own past (self-reported) portfolio returns.
A behavioral interpretation of these facts is that they provide support for the
law of small numbers emphasized by Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and
Rabin (2002). (I discuss a possible rational story below.) Investors subject to
this bias will expect even short samples to reflect the properties of the parent
population and will thus have high expected returns after a period of high
realized returns. However, the dependence of expected returns on investor
age and experience makes this bias more precise by pointing to what defines
the beginning of the (more) relevant small sample—the date the investor
started investing in the market. The data also allow a more detailed analysis
of how investors' expected market return and expected own portfolio return
depend on the past return on their own portfolio to determine whether
investors exhibit biased self-attribution, a key ingredient in the model of
momentum and reversal of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998).
Figure 4a plots the expected one-year stock-market returns of different
investor age groups against time.
1
0 A strong relation between beliefs and
age is apparent with young investors expecting substantially higher
returns than middle-aged investors, who in turn are more optimistic than
older investors. At the peak of the market, young investors, defined as
those younger than 35 years, on average expected the market to do about
5 percentage points better over the next year than did older investors,
those age 60 years or older. The difference narrows as the market declines.
One would expect such narrowing because new data points should be
weighted more by young investors who effectively have a shorter data
sample. How much the gap narrows during the market downturn
depends on whether one uses sample weights or not. Figure 4a uses sam-
ple weights, Figure 4b does not. Differences between age groups narrow
more consistently when the data are not weighted within age groups.
1
1
Analyzing medians rather than means leads to similar patterns,
10. To have a reasonably large number of observations per age group per period, the figure
shows quarterly average expectations rather than monthly average expectations.
11. It is not clear whether weighting is preferred. For calculating overall average expectations
for each time period, weighting is appropriate. When considering the effect of a given
investor characteristic on beliefs in a regression context, however, we know that OLS is effi-
cient (other problems aside), and weighting observations by sampling probabilities leads to
a less efficient estimator. Therefore, I do not use sample weights in the rest of the analysis.Figure 4 AVERAGE EXPECTED ONE- AND TEN-YEAR STOCK-MARKET
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although the difference in median expectations of young and older house-
holds at the peak of the market was around 2% compared to about 5%
when focusing on means (except in the first quarter of 2000, where even
the median difference increases to 5%). Figure 4c shows large age differ-
ences in ten-year expected stock returns as well. Table 1, regression 1, shows
that the age effect is statistically significant at the 5% level in almost all
Table 1 DETERMINANTS OF ONE-YEAR STOCK-MARKET RETURN
EXPECTATIONS, UBS/GALLUP DATA, OLS REGRESSIONS
1







Age*d983 -0.057 -2.03 -0.049 -1.25 -0.012 -0.40
Age*d984 -0.069 -2.27 -0.096 -2.24
Age*d991 -0.115 -5.79 -0.158 -5.55 -0.020 -0.66
Age*d992 -0.082 -5.06 -0.088 -3.74 0.029 1.22
Age*d993 -0.104 -6.30 -0.098 -4.11 -0.037 -1.91
Age*d994 -0.088 -5.35 -0.084 -3.63 0.024 1.24
AgeMOOl -0.125 -7.60 -0.113 -4.74 0.011 0.54
Age*d002 -0.091 -5.73 -0.081 -3.60 -0.001 -0.07
Age*d003 -0.102 -6.03 -0.114 -4.77 -0.006 -0.31
Age*d004 -0.100 -6.00 -0.055 -2.32 -0.029 -1.48
Age*d011 -0.055 -3.40 -0.056 -2.40 0.004 0.21
Age*dO12 -0.053 -3.21 -0.053 -2.18 -0.031 -1.62
Age*dO13 -0.026 -1.61 -0.020 -0.87 -0.034 -1.85
Age*dO14 -0.061 -3.82 -0.066 -2.84 -0.019 -1.03
Age*dO21 -0.049 -3.01 0.004 0.19 0.007 0.38
Age*dO22 -0.056 -3.43 -0.050 -2.14 -0.033 -1.72
Age*dO23 -0.052 -3.22 -0.019 -0.79 -0.038 -2.05


















































































































































































































Adj. R2 = 0.503
N = 17138
Adj. R2 = 0.527
N = 31106
Adj. R2 = 0.590
1. "Experience" refers to years of investment experience, "Own past" refers to the self-reported return on
the investor's portfolio over the past year, 'dYYQ' is a dummy equal to 1 for year YY, quarter Q.
Regression 1 and regression 3 is based on all investors, while regression 2 is for those investors with
$100,000 or more in financial assets.Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 157
quarters. The coefficient on age is allowed to vary over time (by year and
quarter), and time dummies are included separately. The negative effect
of age on the expected stock-market return is strongest around the peak
of the market. Table 1, regression 2, shows that the age effect is as strong
for those with financial assets of $100,000 or more as for the full sample.
Additional evidence regarding the effect on beliefs of the stock-market
returns observed by the investor him- or herself can be gained by consider-
ing the effect of years of investment experience within age groups. If the
dependence of beliefs on age in fact is due to investors weighting stock-market
returns they have observed more, then after a series of good stock returns,
expected returns should be higher for those with low investment experience
for a given age than for those with more years of experience. In Figure 5,
Figure 5 AVERAGE EXPECTED ONE-YEAR STOCK-MARKET RETURNS BY
INVESTMENT EXPERIENCE WITHIN AGE GROUPS, UBS/GALLUP DATA
-Experienci
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Figure 6 AVERAGE EXPECTED ONE-YEAR STOCK-MARKET RETURNS BY
INVESTOR OWN PAST PORTFOLIO RETURN, UBS/GALLUP DATA
• Own Past Return <= 0%
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households are split into those with less than and more than median years of
investment experience, within each age group. Over the time period covered
by the UBS sample, the less experienced investors expect about 1 to 2%
higher market returns, with no clear time pattern in this difference.
A final approach to analyzing how observed returns affect beliefs is to
consider whether there is an effect of own past portfolio returns on expecta-
tions about the market return. This is strongly the case. I sort the respon-
dents into four groups based on their reported own portfolio return over the
past year. Figure 6 shows that, compared to those with reported own past
returns between 0 and 10%, those with own past returns between 10 and
20% expected the market return over the next year to be about 3 to 4 per-
centage points higher, with the difference increasing to about 10 percentage
points for those with own past returns above 20%.
1
2 To determine whether
age, years of investment experience, and own past returns have independ-
ent effects on market expectations, Table 1, regression 3, provides regression
results with all three variables included. Once experience and own past
returns are included, the effect of age largely disappears. Thus, the higher
expected returns of young investors seem to be driven mainly by their
shorter average investment experience and the higher (actual or perceived)
returns on their own portfolios during the stock-market boom. This leads to
12. Some of this effect could be due to measurement error in reported own past portfolio
returns if those who exaggerate their past returns expect high market returns. The asym-
metry of the effect of own past returns on expected market returns (and expected own
returns) documented below is less subject to such problems.Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 159
two possible interpretations of the age effects on stock-market return expec-
tations. The first is that investors are rational, but information about past
market returns is costly. Then investors may rationally form expectations
about future market returns based on their own actual past returns or, if such
information is also costly, own perceived past portfolio returns. Because the
young report higher own past returns, this would provide a rational expla-
nation of the age effect. The second interpretation is that investors of differ-
ent ages are equally informed about past market returns but, due to a
behavioral bias, nonetheless use their own portfolio returns in forming
beliefs about future market returns. The fact that the age effect is equally
strong for the wealthiest half of the sample suggests that information costs
are unlikely to be driving it and thus that a behavioral story is needed.
The data on inflation expectations from the SCAB can be used to deter-
mine whether the age dependence of expectations about stock-market
returns generalizes to other aggregate variables.
1
3 The data also include
each respondent's perception of what inflation was for things he or she
buys during the past year. This is useful for distinguishing the above two
interpretations of the age dependence of stock-market return expecta-
tions. If there is an age effect in inflation expectations but no difference in
past perceived inflation (or the difference is the opposite of what is
needed to explain the age effect in inflation expectations), that would be
evidence against the rational costly information explanation of age effects
in expectations about aggregate variables.
The SCAB asks respondents whether they think prices will go up,
down, or stay the same over the next 12 months. From 1966-1979, respon-
dents who expect price increases are asked for their expected inflation
rate as a percentage. From 1980 onward, all respondents are asked for
their expected inflation rate. Before the third quarter of 1977, all or some
of the percentage responses are categorical. To construct a comparable
time series of expected inflation rates, I assume that inflation is normally
distributed in the cross section of respondents in each quarter or month
(the survey is quarterly up to 1977 and monthly after that). I then estimate
the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation based on the percentage
of respondents who expect inflation to be below 5%, including those
expecting no or negative inflation, and the percentage of respondents who
expect inflation to be below 10%.
1
4 Figure 7 shows the expected inflation
13. See Souleles (2001) and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) for additional description of
the data and analysis of heterogeneity in inflation expectations.
14. In principle, it would be more efficient to use all the inflation categories provided rather
than only two pieces of information. In practice, a lot of the responses are at inflation
rates of 0%, 3%, 5%, 10%, etc. A more sophisticated statistical approach would therefore
need either to use a different distribution than the normal distribution or to model the
rounding of the responses to popular values.160 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
rate for the next 12 months, by age of respondent, for the period
1966-2001. The expectation plotted for a given year and age group is the
cross-sectional average based on responses from all months of that year.
Figure 7b shows similar series for 1975-2001 based on expected (annual)
inflation over the next five to ten years. The actual inflation rate (based on
the consumer price index for all urban consumers) is plotted in Figure 7c.
Because survey interviews are spread out over the year, the actual infla-
tion rate plotted is the annual inflation rate from July of the current year
to July of the following year.
Figure 7 AVERAGE EXPECTED ONE-YEAR AND FIVE-TO-TEN-YEAR
INFLATION RATES BY INVESTOR AGE, SURVEY OF CONSUMER
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR, AND THE ACTUAL INFLATION RATE FOR
THE YEAR, 1966-2001
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Inflation expectations for the coining year peak in 1979 after a period of
high actual inflation rates. In that year, the average expected inflation rate
for the next 12 months of those under age 35 exceeded that of those age
60 or older by 2.5 percentage points. The difference widens to 4.9 per-
centage points in 1981, due to a more dramatic drop in expected inflation
for older respondents in 1980 and 1981, and then gradually diminishes
during the 1980s. For the years starting with 1980, where the expected per-
centage inflation rates are available for all households, a simple approach to
test whether the age differences are significant is to run a pooled OLS
regression of expected inflation rates on year dummies and on age inter-
acted with year dummies, thus allowing the coefficient on age to differ by
year (this approach is similar to that used for stock returns in Table 1). The
regression, not included in a table for brevity, shows that age is significant
at the 5% level in all years from 1980 to 1987. Overall, the age differences
in expectations around the period of high inflation are quite similar to the
evidence for stock-market return expectations. Figure 7b shows that a
strong age pattern is also present in expectations about the level of infla-
tion over the next five to ten years.
In some periods of the survey, households are asked for the inflation
rate (for items they buy) over the past 12 months. Quantitative data, con-
sistently defined across years, are available for 1975-1985. Time series for
average perceived inflation rates are constructed using the same method
as was used for the two forward-looking variables and are illustrated in
Figure 7d. Notably, the youngest group generally have the lowest per-
ceived inflation, while the ordering of the other three age groups depends
on the year in question. A regression (not included in a table) of perceived
inflation over the past 12 months on year dummies and on age interacted
with year dummies can be run for 1980-1985 (again, percentage responses
are available only in a noncategorical form for all respondents from 1980
onward). Perceived inflation is significantly positively related to age in
each of these six years. Consistent with this, the negative effect of age on
expected 12-month inflation is a bit stronger when controlling for per-
ceived past inflation, which itself has a strong positive effect on expected
inflation. Thus, the finding that the old expected much lower inflation
than the young around 1980 is not driven by different perceptions about
inflation over the past year. This again suggests that costs of acquiring
information about the inflation level is not likely to explain the age dif-
ference in beliefs, consistent with the finding for stock return expectations
that the age effect was equally strong for wealthier investors.
Further study of whether the young or the old have more accurate infla-
tion and/or stock-market expectations would be interesting. Whether
weighting recent data more is advantageous depends on the persistence162 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
of the series being predicted and thus could be expected to lead to
improved accuracy for inflation but possibly decreased accuracy for stock
returns. Given the quite short series of expectations on stock returns avail-
able in the UBS/Gallup data, I do not pursue the issue of forecast accu-
racy further.
3.5 BIASED SELF-ATTRIBUTION
Figure 8 illustrates that the dependence of expected one-year stock-market
returns on the investor's own past portfolio return is asymmetric. Figure
8a is based on a regression (not included in a table) of market return
expectations on age, experience, own past portfolio return, and time dum-
mies.
1
5 The age and experience effects are allowed to vary by year and
quarter, as in Table 1. The effect of own past portfolio return is now allowed
to differ depending on whether the return was positive or negative and is
allowed to vary by amount of financial wealth. The regression is estimated
using data only from 2000-2002 where responses (for market and own
return expectations and for own past portfolio returns) of less than 1% are
not combined into one category. Figure 8a plots the predicted effect of own
past portfolio returns on expected one-year market return. For those with
financial wealth less than $100,000, an own past portfolio returns of 25%
increases the expected market return by 10.4%, while an own past portfolio
returns of -25% leads to an increase of 1.6%.
1
6 Thus, while positive own past
portfolio returns leads to higher expected market returns, negative own
past portfolio returns have a quite small and positive effect on expected mar-
ket returns. The effect of positive own past returns is weaker for wealthier
investors, but a 25% own past portfolio return still leads to an increase in the
expected market return of as much as 6.7%, even for those with financial
wealth of $500,000 or more. The difference to the lowest wealth group is sig-
nificant at the 1% level. A diminished effect of positive own past returns was
also found for higher income or higher education groups.
Several robustness checks are needed to determine if these findings
reflect biased self-attribution. If they do, then the asymmetry results
should be stronger for expected own portfolio returns than for expected
market returns because the investor presumably is more likely to think
that high own past portfolio returns are indicative of high future returns
on his or her own portfolio than on the stock market as a whole. Figure 8b
shows that this is indeed the case. The effect of positive own past returns
15. Note that by including time dummies, the effect of own past return on expected market
returns is identified based on cross-sectional differences in own past returns, not based
on time variation in own past returns.
16. Both these effects are significant at the 1% level. About 24% of own past portfolio returns
for 2000-2002 are negative.Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 163
Figure 8 ESTIMATED EFFECT OF OWN PAST PORTFOLIO RETURN ON
EXPECTED ONE-YEAR STOCK-MARKET RETURN AND EXPECTED ONE-
YEAR OWN PORTFOLIO RETURN, UBS/GALLUP DATA
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on expected own portfolio returns over the next year is about 50% larger
than the effect on the expected one-year market return. When focusing
on the expected own portfolio returns, a potentially important concern
is whether the positive slope in the region of negative past own returns
could be due to lack of controls for portfolio choice. The question in the
survey refers to the investor's entire portfolio of financial assets, not just
the return on stockholdings. To get a substantial negative return, an
investor likely had invested a lot in stocks that are likely to have a
higher expected return than other assets. Investors' portfolio shares for
each of the categories "stocks, stock mutual funds," "bonds, bond
mutual funds," "cash, CDs, money market funds," and "real estate
investments" are available for September 1998 and February and May
2001. Using data for these three months, controlling for portfolio shares
has only a negligible impact on the effect of own past portfolio returns
on expected own portfolio returns (or expected market returns).
Another concern may be that an own past return of zero may not be the
most reasonable comparison point against which to evaluate whether
own past portfolio performance is high or low. Allowing for a kink at an
own past portfolio returns of 10% leads to strong positive effects for
own past returns above 10% and a flat relation for own past returns
below 10%.
Overall the results support the assumption of biased self-attribution
made by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998). The finding
that the effect diminishes in investor wealth or other measures of
investor sophistication does suggest, however, that more work is
needed to understand why some investors are more subject to this bias
than others.
3.6 DO BELIEFS AFFECT ACTIONS?
The above results regarding investor beliefs would be of little interest if
expectations reported to the survey are not correlated with investor
choices. For the three months for which portfolio shares for broad invest-
ment categories are available, it is possible to determine whether
investors with higher expected stock returns did in fact have higher
equity portfolio shares.
1
7 Table 2 shows that this is strongly the case in the
region of expected market returns up to 20%. This range covers over 95%
of the investors used in the regression. As another piece of information
about the link between expectations and portfolio holdings, Table 3 turns
17. Since the observed equity portfolio shares are in the range from 0 to 100%, I estimate the
relationship using a two-sided Tobit model. The estimation also controls for age, invest-
ment experience, financial assets, education, and income because these factors may affect
portfolio choice directly and, as discussed earlier, are correlated with expectations.Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 165
Table 2 EFFECT OF EXPECTATIONS ON STOCK HOLDINGS, 1998
(SEPTEMBER), 2001 (FEBRUARY, MAY), UBS/GALLUP DATA, TOBIT
REGRESSIONS
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Portfolio Held in
Regressor
Expected market return dummies (omitted = d
d(0<E(rM)<5)
d(5 < E(rM) < 10)
d(10 < £(rM) < 15)
d(15<E(rM)<20)
d(E(rM)>20)
Time dummies (omitted = d9809)
d0102
d0105
Age dummies (omitted = d(age < 30))
d(30 < age < 40)
d(40 < age < 50)
d(50 < age < 60)
d(60 < age < 70)
d(age > 70)
Experience dummies (omitted = d(experience <
d(5 < experience < 10)
d(10 < experience < 15)






















Financial asset dummy (omitted = d(financial assets < 100 K))
d(financial assets > 100 K) 3.793




Income dummies (omitted = d(income < 40 K))
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to the relation between Internet stockholdings and expectations about
Internet stock returns. Information about Internet stockholdings are
included in six months of the survey spread out over 1999 and 2000.
Investors who expected Internet stocks to have much higher returns
than the stock market on average held as much as 25% more of their166 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
Table 3 INTERNET STOCK HOLDINGS: TOBIT REGRESSION FOR
PERCENTAGE OF PORTFOLIO HELD IN INTERNET STOCKS, 1999 (MARCH,
JUNE, SEPTEMBER) AND 2000 (FEBRUARY, APRIL, JULY), UBS/GALLUP DATA
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Portfolio Held in Internet Stocks
1
Regressor P t-stat P t-stat
Expected Internet stock return dummies (omitted = d(much higher))
d(somewhat higher) -7.787 -4.65 -8.049
d(aboutsame) -18.039 -8.40 -18.462
d(somewhat/much lower) -25.151 -8.81 -22.560
Perceived Internet stock risk dummies (omitted = d(much more risky))
d(somewhat more risky) 4.674 2.89 4.290
d(about same risk) 4.955 2.31 4.723
d(somewhat less/much less risky) 7.276 2.27 9.325
Expected one-year stock market return (omitted = d(0 < E (rM) < 5))
d(0<£(rM)<5) -3.751 -0.80 4.961
d(5 < E(rM) < 10) -0.209 -0.05 5.135
d(10 < E(rM) < 15) 3.835 0.91 8.672
d(15 < E(rM) < 20) 7.147 1.60 11.896
d(E(rM)>20) 8.337 1.84 12.427
Age dummies (omitted = d(age < 30))
d(30<age<40) -8.730 -3.23 -9.565
d(40<age<50) -17.359 -6.17 -15.247
d(50<age<60) -15.801 -5.21 -9.877
d(60<age<70) -21.640 -5.85 -17.218
d(age>70) -23.780 -5.33 -13.569
Experience dummies (omitted = d(experience < 5 years))
d(5 < experience < 10) -6.816 -3.31 -7.961
d(10 < experience < 15) -4.259 -1.80 -1.684
d(15 < experience < 25) -2.669 -1.09 -2.770
d(experience > 25) -0.824 -0.27 3.995
Education dummies (omitted = d(< high school graduate))
d(some college/technical college) 5.051 1.79 9.146
d(college graduate) 10.743 4.04 10.532
d(> college graduate) 11.755 4.33 8.810
Financial wealth dummy (omitted = d(financial assets < 100 K))
d(financial assets > 100 K) 9.617 5.94 6.039
Income dummies (omitted = d(income < 40 K))
d(40 K < income < 50 K) 6.829 1.83 5.155
d(50 K < income < 60 K) 6.296 1.78 1.381
d(60 K < income < 75 K) 10.491 3.14 6.825
d(75 K < income < 100 K) 9.429 2.85 4.905
d(income > 100 K) 19.768 6.08 13.134
Internet use dummies (omitted = d(never gets on Internet))
d(gets on Internet, never purchased online) 8.209
d(gets on Internet, purchased online) 20.500
Constant -32.806 -5.40 -44.982

































1. Regressions include time dummies. The table omits these for brevity.Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 167
portfolio in Internet stocks than those expecting Internet stock returns to
be somewhat lower or much lower than the return on other stocks.
1
8
Lower perceived risk of Internet stocks relative to the risk of the market
similarly has the expected positive effect on Internet stockholdings.
Overall, the portfolio data thus show that investor actions are linked to
their beliefs.
4. The Value of Correlating Irrational Actions with Wealth
In this section, I turn to the other main strand of the behavioral finance lit-
erature, which has focused on types of investor behavior that are incon-
sistent with the recommendations of standard finance models. Part of this
literature is separte from the literature on pricing anomalies, while the
pricing impact of other of these behaviors has been studied and linked to
the pricing puzzles. Of course, even the behaviors listed below that may
not have significant price impact are still important because such behav-
iors could have large effects on the utility of investors who act in suppos-
edly irrational ways.
Investor behaviors that contradict the predictions of traditional finance
models have been surveyed elsewhere (among others, see Barberis and
Thaler [2003] and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh, [2002]). What I would like to
focus on here is whether a given type of seemingly irrational behavior dimin-
ishes with investor wealth or with other measures of investor sophistication.
If the frequency or intensity of such behaviors diminishes substantially
with wealth or sophistication, then two possibilities arise. The first possi-
bility is that these behaviors are driven by information costs that likely
have a large fixed component (once you understand diversification, you
can apply your insights without cost to a larger portfolio). If they are
driven in this way, then investors may be acting rationally given the costs
they face. To confirm this, we would need to establish that the required
information costs are not implausible, and to argue that the behavior
exhibited is a reasonable response to lack of information. The latter is
more likely to be satisfied in cases where the behavior involves too little
action or too simple an action (e.g., lack of investment in some securities,
lack of reallocation) than in cases where the behavior involves too much
action (excessive trading). If information costs are to blame for seemingly
irrational investor behavior, the policy recommendation would be increased
investor education, especially for low-wealth and low-sophistication
18. It is not clear from the question asked whether the Internet portfolio share is the share
of Internet stocks in the investor's equity portfolio or in his or her total financial asset
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investors who may not choose to become informed at their own cost. Of
course, from an efficiency perspective, this would be the policy recom-
mendation only if such education has positive externalities (i.e., that one
educated investor can help another improve his or her choices) or can be
provided more cheaply than the cost at which investors could have
acquired the information on their own.
If behaviors that look irrational based on traditional finance theory
diminish with wealth, a second interpretation is that psychological biases
differ across individuals. Additional analysis of such cases would
improve our understanding of the more fundamental determinants of the
biases in beliefs and behavior and such correlations would need to be
accounted for in models and calibrations of the likely pricing impact of
such biases. To draw a parallel to the traditional finance literature,
absolute risk aversion is typically thought and estimated to be decreasing
in wealth. This does not mean that risk aversion is not a fundamental ele-
ment of preferences or that risk-averse behavior is due to information
costs, but it does mean that it is crucial for modeling and calibration
whether or not this wealth dependency is accounted for. Correlating
investor choices with other investor characteristics would also be helpful
in this context.
Conversely, if a given irrational action remains equally frequent for
high-wealth investors, then it is unlikely to be driven by information
costs and is likely to have substantial impact on equilibrium prices. The
behavioral finance literature is still not at the point where calibration of
theoretical general equilibrium asset pricing models is done to determine
the magnitude of the effects of nonstandard types of behavior on asset
prices. I hope that work will progress to this stage as more information
about investor expectations and actions becomes available and we get
increasingly accurate estimates of the strength of the various biases.
Of course, it is important when considering the relation between biases
and wealth to determine whether reverse causality could be driving the
results. Some of the biases listed below are known to generate poor
returns and thus low wealth. This means that one has to consider
investors with vastly different wealth for comparisons to be robust to
endogeneity issues; look at more exogenous measures of investor wealth
and sophistication, such as labor income or education; or compare the
behavior of different investor types, as in the earlier mentioned studies of
trading behavior of households versus institutions, households versus
foreign investors, and households versus hedge funds. An even better
approach would be to consider the effects of exogenously provided infor-
mation on investor behavior (examples of such studies are given in the
next section).Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 169
A partial list of investor behavior not in accordance with standard
finance theory includes those discussed in the following subsections.
Some of these facts were documented by researchers in the rational camp.
I include them to provide a more complete picture.
4.1 THE DISPOSITION EFFECT
This refers to a tendency of investors to delay selling investments on
which they have incurred losses in the hope that they will recover their
losses. This has been documented in the stock trades of individuals in the
United States (Shefrin and Statman, 1985, and Odean, 1998), in the stock
trades of Israeli individuals (Shapira and Venezia, 2001), in the stock
trades of Finnish individuals and institutions (Grinblatt and Keloharju,
2001b), in the option exercise patterns of employees in the United States
(Heath, Huddart, and Lang, 1999), and in sales patterns for homes
(Genesove and Mayer, 2001).
The leading argument against the disposition effect being a rational
phenomenon is that winners sold by individual investors subsequently
outperform losers not sold (Odean, 1998). Behavioral researchers typically
attribute the disposition effect to prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979), with a reference price equal to the investor's purchase
price. Based on experimental evidence, Kahneman and Tversky argued
that utility should be defined not over wealth or consumption but over
gains and losses, and that people are risk averse in the region of gains, but
risk loving in the region of losses. Such preferences can induce the dispo-
sition effect because investors become risk loving in a security's payoff
after a loss but not after a gain. An alternative behavioral story is a mis-
taken belief in mean-reversion. Odean (1999) argues against this by show-
ing that the stocks purchased by individuals tend to be past winners.
Grinblatt and Han (2002) consider the general equilibrium implications of
the disposition effect. They construct a model where the momentum effect
is driven by some investors exhibiting the disposition effect in their trad-
ing behavior. Goetzmann and Massa (2003) provide evidence that a dis-
position effect factor is priced in the cross section of daily stock returns.
Dhar and Zhu (2002) provide evidence about how the strength of the
disposition effect depends on investor sophistication. Using U.S. data
from a discount brokerage firm, they find that the disposition effect is
only about half as strong for high-income, retired investors as for low-
income investors working in nonprofessional jobs. Controlling for income
and occupation, they also find a significant weakening of the disposition
effect in investor age and in investor trading experience. Twenty percent
of investors in their sample exhibit no disposition effect or exhibit a
reverse disposition effect. Brown, Chapel, da Silva Rosa, and Walter170 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
(2002) analyze the disposition effect using Australian data and find that
the effect is weaker but still significant for investors taking large trading
positions compared to others. Shapira and Venezia (2001) compare the
disposition effect for accounts of independent investors and accounts of
investors who have delegated portfolio management to a professional
portfolio manager. The trades decided on by the investment professionals
exhibit a weaker but still substantial disposition effect. In their study of
the disposition effect in real estate transactions, Genesove and Mayer
(2001) find that the disposition effect is twice as strong for owner-
occupants as for (likely wealthier/more sophisticated) real estate
investors. The evidence overall suggests that the disposition effect
weakens substantially with investor wealth.
4.2 LIMITED DIVERSIFICATION OF STOCK PORTFOLIOS
French and Poterba (1991) emphasize that investors concentrate the vast
majority of their equity portfolios in domestic stocks (the home bias puz-
zle). Coval and Moskowitz (1999) document a local equity preference in
domestic portfolios of U.S. investment managers (home bias as home).
Huberman (2001) reports a similar local stock preference by showing that
the amount invested in local regional Bell phone companies far exceeds
the amount invested in out-of-state regional Bell phone companies in
most states. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001a) report that home bias at
home is also present among Finnish stockholders, while Massa and
Simonov (2003) document it for Swedish investors. Benartzi (2001) ana-
lyzes stockholdings in employer stock and shows that employees invest
23% of their discretionary retirement plan contributions in company
stock. Blume, Crockett and Friend (1974) and many subsequent papers
have emphasized the low number of stocks held by many investors.
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) argue that informational advantages may
motivate local holdings in their sample because fund managers earn an
extra 2.67% per year from their local investments relative to their nonlo-
cal investments. Benartzi (2001) shows that this is not the case for own
company stockholdings. While employees tend to allocate more to com-
pany stock in firms that have done well in the past, retirement plans with
higher discretionary contributions to own company stock do not outper-
form other plans. Benartzi also provides survey evidence that employees
on average think high past returns will continue in the future and that
only 16.4% of the respondents believe company stock is riskier than the
overall stock market, measured by the likelihood of either investment los-
ing half its value over the next five years.
The UBS/Gallup data provide a new opportunity to analyze the rela-
tionship between familiarity, expectations, and investments. For threePerspectives on Behavioral Finance • 171
months in 1999, the survey contains information about both Internet
stockholdings, Internet stock return expectations, and Internet use. Table 4
shows that of those reporting that they use the Internet and have pur-
chased something online, about 69% expected higher returns on Internet
stocks than on other stocks, compared to 40% for those who did not use
the Internet. Internet users also perceived Internet stocks to be riskier.
This finding could be consistent with an information story where Internet
use leads to cheaper or free information about Internet stocks because
Internet stocks probably were riskier and therefore may have had higher
expected returns than other stocks in 1999. The second regression in Table 3
shows, however, that even controlling for expected returns and risk (and
a host of other variables), Internet use has a strong effect on Internet stock-
holdings, with those getting on the Internet and having purchased some-
thing online investing about 20% more in Internet stocks than those who
do not use the Internet. This may be suggestive of an attention effect,
where investors simply do not know about all stocks and invest in those
stocks they—partly by accident—become aware of. Barber and Odean
(2002) and Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2002) find evidence of an atten-
tion effect in the stock purchases of individual investors. If information is
costly, the attention effect could be rational, although one could argue that
any deviations of an investor's equity portfolio from the market portfolio
is irrational.
I turn now to the relation between diversification and wealth/sophisti-
cation. Table 5 documents a relationship between home bias and investor
income. The numbers are from the New York Stock Exchange (2000) and
are based on a survey of 4842 investors in early 1999 (see Investment
Company of America and the Securities Industry Association [1999]). The
home bias is seen to diminish quite strongly with investor income, espe-
cially when it comes to directly held, non-U.S. stock or holdings of foreign
stock through equity mutual funds in retirement accounts. Addressing
home bias as home, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that the prefer-
ence of Finnish investors for local stocks or for stocks with a chief execu-
tive officer (CEO) of their own cultural origin diminishes in investor
sophistication as measured by the number of stocks held by the investors.
Massa and Simonov (2003) find that the local stock preference of Swedish
investors is driven purely by low-wealth investors.
Table 6 uses data from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances
to document that the number of stocks held in directly held equity port-
folios is strongly increasing in the wealth of the household. While house-
holds with net worth below $100,000 hold on average just a couple
of stocks in directly held stock portfolios (conditional on having any
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households with a net worth of $1 million or more. In an earlier study
(Vissing-Jorgensen, 1999), I argue that the percentage of equity owned by
very poorly diversified investors in terms of the number of stocks is quite
small. Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) analyze equity portfolio diversifica-
tion using investor accounts at a particular brokerage firm and conclude
that the majority of such investors are very poorly diversified. While
analysis of brokerage accounts can be useful (for example, for analyzing
the disposition effect) it is less compelling for analyzing diversification.
Investors may use multiple brokers or hold most of their equity portfolios
in mutual funds. Overall, investors with larger amounts of wealth or
income, and thus greater incentives to become informed, hold better
diversified portfolios than others.
4.3 LIMITED ASSET MARKET PARTICIPATION
A more extreme example of poor diversification is limited asset market
participation. Many households have zero holdings of certain asset
classes. The most well known is limited participation in stock markets.
Other examples include holding no bonds or no investment real estate.
The papers in the volume edited by Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2002)
provide evidence that limited participation in markets for risky assets is
prevalent in many countries. In Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and in Section 5
below, I consider the role that costs of stock-market participation may
play in providing a rational explanation for this. Heaton and Lucas (1999),
Polkovnichenko (2001), I (Vissing-Jorgensen, 1998), and others have con-
sidered the equilibrium impact of limited participation on the equity pre-
mium. The consensus is that, in standard models where the equity
premium is small with full participation, limited participation on its own
will have some but not a dramatic effect on the equilibrium equity pre-
mium.
Table 6 illustrates that stock-market participation is strongly increasing
in investor wealth and income. I return to this fact in Section 5.
4.4 NAIVE DIVERSIFICATION OF RETIREMENT ACCOUNT
CONTRIBUTIONS
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) document that the relative number of equity-
type investment options offered in 401 (k) plans affects the mean alloca-
tion to equities of plan participants. Investors in plans that are in the
highest third in terms of percentage of equity-type investment options
invest 64% on average in stocks, compared to 49% for investors in plans
in the bottom third in terms of equity-type options. Experimental evi-
dence roughly confirms these magnitudes and also suggests that this is
driven by some investors choosing portfolio shares of 1/n for each plan176 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
option. A 1/n rule seems like a reasonable response to diversifying for an
investor who understands the basic idea of diversification but not the
exact differences between asset classes. Correlating this type of behavior
with income or wealth would be informative for determining if a simple
information explanation is likely.
4.5 STATUS QUO BIAS IN RETIREMENT ACCOUNT ALLOCATIONS
Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) analyze a ten-year panel of TIAA-CREF par-
ticipants. Consistent with earlier findings of Samuelson and Zeckhauser
(1988), they find that both changes in flow allocations and reallocation of
accumulated assets are rare: 47% of individuals made no changes in flow
allocations over a ten-year period; 73% made no changes in the allocation
of accumulated assets. Ameriks and Zeldes suggest a rational explana-
tion, namely, that individuals may face a nonmonetary fixed cost per
transaction. If so, we would expect the status quo bias to diminish with
the dollar amount invested, and thus with employee salary. The bias
would also be expected to diminish with age or years of employment
because a certain amount of free information about the value of reallo-
cating arrives over time from interaction with colleagues and friends.
Table 7 shows that these predictions are borne out in the data. The table
is from Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003), who analyze data from a
large 401 (k) plan. They find that employees with higher income and
older employees place substantially more trades (changes in flow contri-
butions and allocation of existing assets) and have a higher retirement
asset turnover than younger employees and employees with lower
income.
4.6 EXCESSIVE TRADING
In sharp contrast to the trading behavior in retirement plans, some
investors trading though brokers or online trade frequently and on average
Table 7 EFFECT OF HOUSEHOLD SALARY AND AGE ON STATUS QUO













































Source: Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003), Tables 4 and 5.Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 177
lose money by trading as a result of the transaction costs involved. Odean
(1999) finds an average monthly turnover rate of 6.5% in a sample of dis-
count brokerage customers. He argues that trading by these investors is
excessive because the stocks purchased perform worse on average than
the stocks sold, implying that the trades are disadvantageous even before
payment of commissions. Using a sample of accounts at a discount bro-
kerage firm, Barber and Odean (2000) find that the average investor in
their sample performs about the same as the S&P500 index before costs
but underperforms the index by 1.5% per year after costs. Within the sam-
ple, those in the top quintile in terms of turnover underperform the index
by 5.5% per year after costs. The authors argue that overconfidence moti-
vates frequent trading.
Table 8 provides evidence on the dependence of trading in directly held
stocks on wealth and income. Wealthier households trade much more
than less wealthy households, with about one-quarter of the wealthiest
group (those with 1 million or more in net worth) trading more than ten
times per year. This could be interpreted as evidence that wealthier
investors are more overconfident than others. This interpretation would
Table 8 EFFECT OF HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH ON TRADING
FREQUENCY FOR DIRECTLY HELD STOCKS
Net worth < $10 K $10-50 K $50-100 K




























































































Source: Calculated using data from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (using survey
weights).178 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
be consistent with the earlier evidence provided on biased self-attribution.
Alternatively, high-wealth investors were seen to hold more shares on
average, and that fact could be driving the results (portfolio turnover can-
not be calculated in the survey of Consumer Finances). It would be inter-
esting to correlate the dependence of underperformance due to frequent
trading in Barber and Odean's (2000) study with wealth (or, better, labor
income or education) to determine whether the wealthy are in fact trad-
ing more excessively than others with direct stockholdings or whether
their frequent trading is rational. Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway (2002)
document significant persistence in the performance of invididual
investors buying and selling directly held stocks through a particular bro-
kerage firm, suggesting that some do seem to have investment skill.
In sum, the evidence suggests that most of the seeming irrational
investor behaviors are weaker for investors with higher wealth or income
(frequent trading of directly held stocks being the main exception). This
points to information or transactions costs as a potentially important con-
tributing factor for these behaviors. I now turn to a simple calculation of
the costs needed to explain one such behavior, namely, limited stock-market
participation.
5. Costs of Stock-Market Participation
Information and/or transaction costs are a possible explanation for
investor behavior that consists of inaction/too infrequent action/too sim-
ple action relative to the predictions of traditional finance theory. For each
such behavior, however, it must be shown that the necessary costs are not
implausibly large. In this section I give an example of how one might
approach such a calculation in the case of stock-market participation. I
start by considering which types of costs may be involved and then turn
to an estimation of how large a per-period cost of stock-market participa-
tion would be needed to explain the choices of a substantial fraction of
those who do not participate in the stock market.
5.1 COSTS FACED BY STOCK-MARKET INVESTORS
Consider the optimization problem of a household that maximizes
expected lifetime utility given an exogenous stream of nonfinancial
income and that faces the opportunity to invest in two assets: a risky asset
and a riskless asset. The risky asset represents the stock market. The risk-
less asset is a catchall for less risky financial assets such as bonds, T-bills,
bank accounts, etc. I assume it is free to invest in the riskless asset,
whereas investing in stocks may involve several types of costs. First-time
buyers likely incur an initial cost F
1 representing the time/money spentPerspectives on Behavioral Finance • 179
understanding basic investment principles as well as acquiring enough
information about risks and returns to determine the household's optimal
mix between stocks and riskless assets. Add to that the cost of time spent
setting up accounts. Subsequently, a per-period stock-market participa-
tion cost F
p may be incurred. This cost would include the value of time
spent throughout the year determining if trading is optimal. With time-
varying conditional asset return distributions, theory suggests that house-
holds should actively follow the stock market to form more precise
expectations of future returns and change their portfolios accordingly. For
households who attempt to gather information and thus benefit from
buying individual stocks or subcomponents of the stock-market index,
the cost of this would also be included in F
p. A more subtle part of F
p is
that stocks complicate tax returns. According to Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) numbers for 2002, households who have to fill out schedules D and
Dl (the schedules for capital gains and losses) spend 8 hours and 34 min-
utes on average doing so. In addition to F and F
p, stock-market investors
face a fixed cost of trading stocks, including the fixed part of brokerage com-
missions as well as the value of time spent implementing the trade. Investors
also face variable (proportional) costs of trading stocks. For directly held
stocks, this cost represents the bid-ask spread and the variable part of bro-
kerage commissions.
1
9 Indirect holding of stocks also involve transaction
costs. For load mutual funds, the front load paid on entry into the fund
would enter the proportional trading costs. In addition, or as an alternative,
some funds have contingent deferred sales loads requiring investors to pay
a certain percentage of their initial investment if they sell their mutual fund
shares before a given number of years. These again work as a variable cost.
Annual expenses on mutual funds also reduce investor returns.
2
0
The above discussion emphasizes the costs of acquiring and processing
information as an important element of F
1 and F
p. Several recent papers
find evidence that households who report to be better informed about
financial issues make portfolio decisions more in line with theoretical pre-
dictions by having a higher probability of owning risky financial assets
and holding a larger number of financial asset classes (see Guiso and
Jappelli [2002] for evidence based on Italian data; Alessie, Hochguertel,
and van Soest [2002] for results based on Dutch data; and Eymann and
19. Jones (2001) documents a quite strong decline in NYSE average one-way transaction
costs (commissions plus half of the bid-ask spread) since the mid 1970s, from around 1.10
percentage points in 1970 to around 0.20 percentage point in the late 1990s. Consistent
with the importance of trading costs, turnover has increased dramatically over the same
period (of course, reverse causality cannot be ruled out based on these aggregate data).
20. Investment Company Institute (2002) estimates average annual total shareholder costs
(operating expenses plus distribution costs) for equity mutual funds of 2.26% in 1980,
gradually declining to 1.28% in 2001.180 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
Borsch-Supan [2002] for findings from German data). While these relations
may not be causal, other papers suggest a causal effect of information on
savings and portfolio choice. Chiteji and Stafford (2000) find that parental
stockholding has a strong effect on the probability that children become
stockholders, controlling for economic and demographic characteristics of
the children as well as for bequests. This suggests an effect of education
about financial matters on stock-market participation. Duflo and Saez
(2002) study retirement plan choices among the employees in various
departments of a particular university. They find that the decision to enroll
in a tax-deferred account plan (and the choice of mutual fund vendor for
people who enroll) is affected by the decisions of other employees in the
same department. Information flow from colleagues is a plausible explana-
tion for such effects. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2003) provide related evi-
dence of peer effects. Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (2001) find that the
savings rate of households who grew up in a state with a high school finan-
cial curriculum mandate is about 1.5 percentage points higher than for oth-
ers, controlling for income and demographics. Bernheim and Garrett (2003)
find similar effects for employer-based retirement education plans.
5.2 HOW LARGE ARE THE COSTS NEEDED TO EXPLAIN
NONPARTICIPATION?
I now turn to a simple estimation of how large costs are needed to explain
nonparticipation in the stock market by many households. I focus on the
case with a fixed per-period participation cost F
p only, but discuss how an
entry cost or transaction costs may affect the results. I first estimate how
large a value of F
p is needed for participation costs to explain the major-
ity of nonparticipants' choices not to participate in the stock market. This
assumes that all nonparticipating households face the same value of F
p.
Then I allow F
p to differ across households and estimate its cross-sectional
distribution. The advantage of allowing heterogeneity in F
p is that it
enables the framework to explain different participation choices of
households with similar wealth and other observable characteristics.
Both estimations are based on estimating the benefits of stock-market
participation for each household, taking as given its current level of finan-
cial wealth. The advantage of this simple approach over a more structural
one is that it allows me to use the actual distribution of financial wealth in
the data without providing a detailed model able to generate the
observed distribution. The most closely related paper on costs of stock-
market participation is Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000). They focus on
all interest-bearing assets and the per-period cost of investing in such
assets. At an interest rate of 5%, they estimate the median cost of holding
interest-bearing assets to be $111 per year. I focus on stockholdings onlyPerspectives on Behavioral Finance • 181
and present a theoretical argument to clarify the assumptions needed for
the analysis of per-period participation costs. In addition, I consider a case
where the cost is restricted to be the same for all nonparticipants so that
one can identify the smallest cost needed to explain the choice of a given
percentage of nonparticipants. Other related papers on investment costs
and asset pricing are Luttmer (1999) and Paiella (1999), who focus on the
costs needed to prevent households from adjusting their consumption
from its current value (as opposed to reallocating existing financial
wealth, as emphasized here).
5.2.1 Theoretical Framework My approach to estimating the benefits of
stock-market participation relies on the definition of the certainty equiva-
lent return to a portfolio. Start by considering a one-period setting with
utility defined over end-of-period wealth and with no nonfinancial
income. Consider a portfolio with stochastic net return r. If household i
invests an amount W{ in the portfolio at the beginning of the period, end-
of-period wealth is W. (1 + r). The certainty equivalent end-of-period
wealth Wt




Correspondingly, the certainty equivalent return to the portfolio rf
e can be
defined as:
EU[Wf-(l + r)]=li[Wl-(l + ^)] (2)
with the interpretation that the investor is indifferent between investing
Wj in the risky portfolio with stochastic return r and investing it in a risk-
less portfolio with return r[
e. In a setting with participation costs of invest-
ing in the risky portfolio, replace initial wealth by Wf
osi - W{ - F
p. This
wealth level then enters on the right side of the equation as well:
ElT[W,
Post(l + r)] = l[[W
Post(l + r,
ce)] (3)
If the risky portfolio consists of stocks and riskless assets in the frac-
tions a, and 1 - a,, the above equation says that:
EU{W*°«[1 + rf + at(rs- rf)]} = lT[W,
Post(l + r?)] (4)
where rs is the stock return and rf the riskless rate. Since the only risk in
the portfolio of stocks and riskless assets stems from stocks, the certainty
equivalent return to stocks r0 can be defined by the equation:
21. In the terminology of Pratt (1964), W,
ce is given by E[Wj (1 + r)\ - nu where TC, is the risk
premium that makes the investor indifferent between receiving the stochastic amount W,
(1 + r) and receiving the certain amount E [W, (1 + r)] - jt,.182 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
's"-rf)]} (5)
which states that the investor is indifferent between investing fractions cc,
and 1 - a, in a portfolio of stocks and riskless bonds and investing all of
W,
Pos
t in a riskless asset with net return rf+ oc, (rsf- rj). If the household is
risk averse, then r[
e is a number smaller than the expected net return on
the risky portfolio E [rf+ a, (rs - rf)]. Therefore, if a, > 0 rsj< E (rs). A house- hold choosing a, > 0 furthermore reveals that rsf> rf.
Consider now the more realistic case where households live for multi-
ple periods and have nonfinancial income. In this case, we can define the
certainty equivalent stock return rsft +1 by the following equation:
maxLZ(C,J + pEty(+1{(Wr
t-C^[l + rp + 1+a,f(r-.f + 1-rp + 1)] + y,f + 1} (6)
where Vt+1 (WI(+1) denotes the value function defined over date t +1 wealth
and (3 is the discount factor. On the left side of this equation, the expecta-
tion is taken over rst+1 and Yi)t+1. On the right side, it is taken over Yit+1 only
because rsft +1 is nonstochastic. In the above definition, consumption in
period t is allowed to differ depending on whether the risky portfolio or
the riskless portfolio is held. Below, however, I will need to assume that
the chosen consumption for period t (but not for future periods) is
approximately unaffected by the portfolio choice.
The certainty equivalent stock return can now be used to determine the
value of participating in the stock market. Given the definition of r
cs%t+l/
the household will choose to participate in the stock market in the current
period if:
where, as earlier, W/
os
t = W;t - F
p.
Below I consider two estimations. The first, estimation A, estimates the
per-period cost sufficient to explain the choices of a given percentage of
nonparticipants. The second more ambitious approach, estimation B, esti-
mates the distribution of participation costs in the population.
5.2.2. Estimation A: Homogeneous F
p From equation (7), it follows that the
gross benefit, as of time t +1, of participating in the stock market in period t is:
Benefit, = (Wf
s
t - C,) a, (r£, + 1 - rfit + 1) (8)Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 183
under the simplifying assumption that period t consumption (but not
future consumption) is unaffected by whether or not the household
decides to enter the stock market.
On the cost side, the per-period cost of stock-market participation that
could be avoided in period t by not entering, or entering in a subsequent
period, reduces W,-,+1 by:
Avoidable cost,, = F
p (1 + rf;, + x) (9)
A value of F
p (1 + rft + 2) greater or equal to Benefit,, is sufficient to deter the
household from participating in this period.
2
2 A lower value will also be
sufficient if there are transactions costs (because the household would
need to be able to recover these additional costs either in this period or in
future periods of stock-market participation). In other words, if x% of
nonparticipants have benefits less than y dollars in period t, then it is con-
servative to say that a per-period cost of F
p = y is sufficient to explain the
nonparticipation of x% of nonparticipants.
Under an additional assumption one can be more precise.
Assumption A: The per-period benefits of stock-market participation for
observed nonparticipants are approximately the same across time periods
for a given household i.
Most important, this assumes approximately constant holdings of
financial wealth across periods for this group.
2
3 Then the entry condition
states that the household should participate if:
Benefit,, > F
p + annuity value of all stock-market
transaction costs for household i (10)
I will refer to the right side as the total participation cost, F,
Toffl/. The
advantage of this is that it no longer ignores the potential importance of
any initial entry cost F
1 or transaction costs (but at the cost of the extra
assumption needed). The annuity value is calculated over years of stock-
market participation.
2
4 Under assumption A, one can then estimate the
annualized value of total stock-market participation costs which is suffi-
cient to explain the nonparticipation of x% of nonparticipants. One prob-
lem with assumption A is that there may be a life-cycle component to
22. Because 1 + r^, +: is close to 1, for simplicity I replace F
p (1 + rft+l) by F
p in what follows.
23. This assumption clearly would make less sense for participants because they decided to
enter the stock market at some point, which suggests that their financial wealth likely
increased to make this optimal.
24. Note that, unlike F, F
F and the transaction costs, which are exogenous parameters in the
household's problem, the total participation cost has an endogenous element because the
number of periods of stock-market participation is chosen by the household.184 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
financial wealth even for relatively low-wealth households. One could
consider repeating the estimations below with middle-aged households
to provide a more conservative estimate of the costs needed to explain
nonparticipation.
The data for the estimation come from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). I use the Survey Research Center sample of the PSID,
which was representative of the civilian noninstitutional population of the
United States when the study was started in 1968. The PSID tracks all orig-
inal family units and their adult offspring over time. With low attrition
rates, the sample therefore remains representative as long as offspring are
included. To keep the sample representative of the U.S. population, I
exclude the poverty sample and the Latino sample. Wealth information
from the 1984, 1989, and 1994 supplements is used to calculate financial
wealth, defined as the sum of cash (checking or savings accounts, money
market bonds, or Treasury bills, including such assets held in individual
retirement accounts [IRAs]), bonds (bond funds, cash value in life insurance
policies, valuable collections, rights in trusts or estates), and stocks (shares
of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts,
including stocks in IRAs). To identify entries for which imputations were
used, I use the wealth information as given in the family files instead of the
wealth supplement files. Imputed values for cash, bonds, or stocks can then
be coded as missing. Topcoding of wealth or income variables is very rare
in the PSID, and topcoded variables were left at their topcodes. Although in
reality households can have a portfolio share for a given asset above one,
the PSID wealth data does not allow one to observe this due to the way the
wealth questions are formulated. For example, the questions asked con-
cerning stockholdings are "Do you (or anyone in your family living there)
have any shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or
investment trusts, including stocks in IRAs?" and "If you sold all that and
paid off anything you owed on it, how much would you have?" Thus, a
household who had borrowed to invest more than its total financial wealth
in stocks would be recorded as having a portfolio share for stocks of one.
Similarly, it is not possible to identify short sales from these questions. To
allow comparison of amounts for different years, wealth variables are
deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) for all urban consumers, with
1982-1984 as the basis year. My earlier paper (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) con-
tains summary statistics for the sample. Among households with positive
financial wealth, the percentage who owns stocks is 28.4% in 1987,37.0% in
1989, and 44.2% in 1994. Among all households in the sample, 23.7% own
stocks in 1987, compared to 29.1% in 1989, and 36.4% in 1994.
To implement estimation A, I make three additional assumptions. First,
I calculate the benefit of stock-market participation as Witat (rs
ce. t + 1 - rfJ + 1)Perspectives on Behavioral Finance • 185
Figure 9 STOCK-MARKET PARTICIPATION BENEFITS FOR
NONPARTICIPANTS, PSID
1200
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Percentile of Annual Stock Market Participation Benefit
7Post rather than (W-t
 os
t - Cu) a, (r^ t + 1- rfJ + 1). This overstates the benefits both
by assuming that no wealth must be set aside for current period
consumption and by replacing W|
os
t (financial wealth after participation
costs) with observed financial wealth. Second, I assume a value of
rf,i, t + \ ~
 rf,t + i°f 0-04. With a historical equity premium around 7% and a
tax rate of, for example, 20 percentage points, the after-tax equity return
will be 5.6%.
2
5 Since the certainty equivalent excess return on stocks is risk
adjusted, 4% seems, if anything, to be a high value. Thus, both these
assumptions are conservative because they most likely overstate the bene-
fits of stock-market participation and thus the costs needed to explain non-
participation. Third, for the values of ait, I assume that each nonparticipant
would have had a value of ait equal to the average value for participants
in the PSID in that year (43.6 for 1989,55.2 for 1994). Having calculated the
period t benefit of stock-market participation for each of the nonpartici-
pants as Wit at 0.04,1 calculate the percentiles of the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of this benefit in the set of nonparticipants. Figure 9 illustrates these
25. The exact tax rate is difficult to calculate because some stockholdings are in pensions
plans where returns accumulate tax-free and are taxed only on withdrawal.186 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
percentiles and thus gives the minimum dollar amount necessary to
explain the choices of various percentages of nonparticipants.
The curve labeled 1989 in Figure 9 shows the percentiles of the benefit
distribution for those who were nonstockholders in 1989 (and in 1984 to
be reasonably confident that the household did not participate in earlier
periods). The benefits are calculated based on the households' 1989 financial
wealth. Similarly the curve labeled 1994 is based on those who were non-
participants in 1994 and 1989. For readability, the figure leaves out per-
centiles above the 95th percentile.
In both 1989 and 1994, half of nonparticipants had estimated real
annual stock-market participation benefits of less than $30. The price
index used to calculate the real values has a basis value of one on average
over the years 1982-1984. Multiply dollar values in the figure by 1.817 to
adjust them to January 2003 dollars. Thus, a per-period stock-market par-
ticipation cost (or a total participation cost under assumption A) of
around $55 in 2003 prices is enough to explain the nonparticipation of half
the nonparticipants. This reflects the fact that these households had little
or no financial wealth to invest. Of the nonparticipants in 1989 (and 1984),
around 21% had no financial wealth. Of the nonparticipants in 1994 (and
1989), about 29% had no financial wealth.
Interpreting the per-period participation cost as the cost of additional
time spent following the market and doing more complicated taxes, a cost
of $55 translates into less than 4 hours at an hourly wage of $15 per hour.
For both 1989 and 1994, a cost of $150 per year (about $275 in 2003 prices)
is enough to explain the choices of 75% of nonparticipants.
5.2.3. Estimation B: Heterogeneous F
p Suppose now that F
F is allowed to
differ across households and time. This improves the models' ability to
explain different choices by households with similar observable charac-
teristics. For now, assume again that F
1 and transactions costs are zero.
I return to the possible effects of these costs below.
Given the definition of the benefit of stock-market participation in equa-
tion (8), a simple approach to estimating the cross-sectional distribution of
F
p at date t is as follows. Suppose that ait = at for all i, that rl\ t + 1 - Tjit + 1
0.04 Vz, and that F
p is uncorrelated with financial wealth in the cross sec-
tion of households. Given these assumptions, the stock-market participa-
tion condition states that household i should participate in period t if:
(Wr
t-C,)af0.04>F;f(l + r//( + 1) (11)
This condition is similar to the condition used by Mulligan and Sala-i-
Martin (2000) in the context of the demand for interest-bearing assets
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Since the incentive to participate is linear in financial wealth, one can
estimate the cross-sectional distribution of Fft directly from the wealth dis-
tribution at date t. A simple nonparametric approach consists of calculat-
ing the percentage of households in different financial wealth groups who
participate in the stock market. For example, if 27% of households with
financial wealth of $10,000 participate, then 27% of these households must
have participation costs below $10,000a,0.04 = $400af [as in estimation A,
replace (W,f
os
t - Cit) with Wit and F% (1 + rf/M) with FJ-]. Given the assump-
tion that F,f is cross-sectionally uncorrelated with Wit, this implies that 27%
of all households must have had participation costs below $400af. By split-
ting the sample into 10 wealth deciles and using this approach for each
decile, one obtains 10 estimates of points on the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) for the cross-sectional distribution of Fft.
How will the presence of an initial entry cost F
l or of transaction costs
affect this estimation? Such costs imply that stock-market participation
status becomes a state variable in the household's value function. This is
the case because participating today affects the choices available tomor-
row given the entry or transaction costs. In the example above where
27% of those with approximately $10,000 in financial wealth were stock-
market participants, one can no longer be sure that this implies that 27%
of the draws of F[t are below $400ccf. Let Sit be an indicator variable for
whether household i participates in the stock market in period t. At date
t, households can be split into four groups according to their participation
choices at t -1 and t: (SiH = 0, Sit = 0), (S^ = 0, Sit = 1), (S;>1 = 1, Stt = 0), (Sy_ i = 1, Sit = 1). We would like to determine the percentage of the draws of
F-t that are less than $400oc,. The group {Sit_x = 0, Sit - 1) poses no difficul-
ties. We can be sure that their Fft draw is less than $400a( (because their
choice reveals that the period t benefit exceeds F
p plus any part of entry
or transaction costs that must be covered by the period t benefits for entry
to have been worthwhile). With the group {Sit_x = 1, Sjt = 0), we can be sure
that their F,f draw is above $400at because they have revealed that F;f
exceeds their current period benefit of $400ccf plus any future transaction
costs they may save by staying in the market during this period.
2
6 The
possible misclassifications arise for the groups choosing (S, w = 0, Sit = 0)
or (S,-,_! = 1, Sit = 1). Those choosing (S,-w = 0, Sit = 0) reveal only that $400at is not sufficient to cover Fft plus any part of the entry and transaction costs
that must be covered by a period t gain for entry to have been optimal.
Thus, they reveal Fft > $400ocf - zf for some positive value z°°. Using the
approach outlined above and classifying them all as having F[t > $400oc(
26. For example, a household with a temporary increase in consumption needs may decide
to run down only nonstock wealth in this period and thus save the transaction costs
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leads one to overestimate the deciles of the cost distribution. However,
those choosing (S^ = 1, Sit = 1) lead to a counterbalancing bias: they
reveal only that $400oc, plus any future transaction costs they save by
staying in the market during this period exceeds F,f; i.e., that Ffi
< $400at + z)l for some positive value z". Thus, classifying them all as having
F[t < $400oct leads one to understimate the deciles of the cost distribution.
Overall, if an equal number of each of the (S;>1 = 0, Sit = 0) households and
the (S;>1 = 1, Sit = 1) households are misclassified, then the approach out-
lined, assuming the absence of transaction costs, will lead to an unbiased
estimate of the cross-sectional distribution of F-f. Because it is difficult to
evaluate whether the two biases are likely to cancel each other, the cost dis-
tributions estimated below should be interpreted with some caution.
In both estimation A and B, one can allow for heterogeneity in ait across
households (rather than only across time). Nonparticipants may have
chosen to stay out of the market due to a low optimal stock share condi-
tional on participation. Accounting for heterogeneity based on a sample
selection model has only small effects on the results, however, and for
simplicity is therefore omitted from the results shown. Essentially, this is
due to the fact that while the fit in models of the stock-market participa-
tion decision is quite high, models of the share invested in stocks condi-
tional on participation typically has low explanatory power (possibly due
to transaction costs of portfolio adjustment leading to substantial differ-
ences between optimal and observed portfolio shares for equity).
The results of estimation B are shown in Figure 10 for the sample of all
households with positive financial wealth. Again assume that ait (the
actual or potential share of financial wealth invested in stocks) for each
household equals the average value for participants in the PSID in that
year (43.4 for 1984, 43.6 for 1989, and 55.2 for 1994). Households with no
financial wealth provide no information about the participation cost in
this approach because their benefit of stock-market entry is zero, assum-
ing they cannot borrow or change their current consumption to invest in
the stock market. The median per-period participation cost is around $350
(real 1982-1984 dollars) for 1994, around $500 for 1989, and around $800
for 1984. Even among very rich households, not all hold stocks, so the esti-
mated CDF does not reach 1 at any wealth level (the point corresponding
to the last wealth decile is not included in the graph but is also far below 1).
This emphasizes the advantage of using a nonparametric approach
because a parametric approach would impose the requirement that the
CDF reaches 1. The economic implication is that participation costs are
unlikely to be the explanation for nonparticipation among high-wealth
households. More generally, if some of the nonparticipants at each wealth
level have chosen not to hold stocks for reasons other than participationPerspectives on Behavioral Finance • 189
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costs, my estimated CDF of the cost distribution will be shifted down
compared to the true CDF.
Overall the results of the estimations of stock-market participation costs
show that, while it is not reasonable to claim that participation costs can
reconcile the choices of all nonparticipants, modest costs are sufficient to
understand the choices of a large part of these households due to their
fairly low amounts of financial wealth.
6. Conclusion
Behavioral finance, and behavioral economics more generally, is a very
active area of research. The state of the literature is still one of exploration,
with little agreement among researchers on what the most important
investor biases are from an asset-pricing perspective.
In this paper I have argued that more direct evidence about the beliefs
and actions of investors would make behavioral theories more convincing
to outsiders, many of whom remain unconvinced that any of the multi-
tude of biases documented in the psychology literature and the experi-
mental literature have much impact on asset prices (see Hirshleifer [2001]
for a thorough discussion of the evidence from psychology and experi-
ments). To exemplify the potential value of such direct evidence, I have190 • VISSING-JORGENSEN
analyzed new data from UBS/Gallup on investor expectations and stock-
holdings for 1998-2002. The evidence suggests that, even for wealthy
investors, (1) expected returns were high at the peak of the market; (2)
many investors thought the market was overvalued but would not correct
quickly; (3) investors' beliefs depend on their own investment experience (a
version of the law of small numbers); (4) the dependence of beliefs on own
past portfolio performance is asymmetric, consistent with theories of biased
self-attribution; and (5) investor beliefs do affect their stockholdings, sug-
gesting that understanding beliefs is in fact useful for understanding prices.
I then turned to existing evidence about investor behaviors that are
inconsistent with traditional finance theory recommendations. Information
and/or transaction costs represent a possible rational explanation of behav-
iors that involve too little action or too simple actions relative to the theo-
retical benchmark. I argued that many such behaviors tend to diminish
with investor wealth and sophistication and thus that information and
transaction costs should be seriously considered as an explanation. As an
example, a simple calculation showed that, given the observed distribution
of financial wealth, an annual cost of about $55 is enough to explain the
choices of half of those who do not invest in the stock market.
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Comment
JOHN Y. CAMPBELL
Harvard University and NBER
Almost 20 years ago, Robert Shiller, Lawrence Summers, and Richard
Thaler challenged the finance profession to take seriously the possibility
that investor behavior and asset prices deviate from the predictions of
simple rational models. Since that time, behavioral finance has become
one of the most active areas in financial economics, maturing to the point
where it can be summarized in both popular and professional books
(Shiller, 2000; Shleifer, 2000). Behavioral economics has had great success
more generally, as illustrated by the award of the 2001 Clark Medal to
Matthew Rabin and the 2002 Nobel Prize to Daniel Kahneman andComment • 195
Vernon Smith, and behavioral finance is probably the most successful
application of this approach.
In asset pricing, it is often hard to draw clear distinctions between
behavioral and other research. Empirical researchers document system-
atic tendencies for some types of assets to outperform others, or for assets
to perform better at some times than others. Very weak restrictions on
asset markets ensure that these patterns can be explained by the properties
of a stochastic discount factor that summarizes the rewards for taking on
different kinds of risks. Behavioral finance models may derive the sto-
chastic discount factor from nonstandard models of investor preferences,
such as the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), but this can
be hard to distinguish from more conventional models with features such
as habit formation.
Behavioral finance is more distinctive in its insistence that we should
try to measure the beliefs and actions of particular investors. We should
not assume that investors' beliefs are homogeneous or rational, or that
they deviate only idiosyncratically from a common set of rational beliefs.
Rather, we should identify meaningful groups of investors and explore
the possibility that these groups have different beliefs that induce them to
trade with one another. Equilibrium asset prices emerge from the interac-
tions of these heterogeneous investors.
Initially, the behavioral literature distinguished two groups of
investors: rational investors and irrational noise traders. This raises the
question of which investors play the role of noise traders. Much recent
work has emphasized the distinction between individual investors, who
may be particularly susceptible to cognitive limitations and psychological
biases, and institutions, which seem likely to be more rational but may be
limited in their risk-taking capacity. Vissing-Jorgensen's paper follows
this tradition and examines a fascinating new dataset on the expectations
of individual investors.
1. The UBS/Gallup Survey
The UBS/Gallup telephone survey has some inherent limitations. The
most serious issue is whether respondents answer the survey questions
accurately. Any survey that involves telephoning people at home in the
evening is likely to elicit hasty or flippant responses. This is a particular
problem here because the survey is relatively ambitious, going far
beyond simple questions with binary answers such as yes/no or
Republican/ Democrat. Accurate answers require both effort and com-
prehension. Questions about recent portfolio performance, for example,
may require respondents to aggregate information from multiple brokerage196 • CAMPBELL
and retirement accounts, while questions about expected future long-
term returns require respondents to understand the difference between
annual and cumulative returns. These problems do not mean that the
data are worthless, but they do limit the weight that can be placed on the
results.
A second limitation of the UBS/Gallup survey is that it is a series of
cross sections and not a panel; thus, it cannot be used to track the expec-
tations of particular individuals through time. Previous research has
shown that the beliefs of different market participants may evolve in
very different ways. Brav, Lehavy, and Michaely (2002), for example, look
at the price targets issued by stock analysts and use these to construct
analysts' return expectations. They argue that these numbers represent
the expectations not only of the analysts themselves but also of the
investors who follow them. They compare the price targets of analysts
employed by sell-side brokerage firms (First Call data over the period
1997-2001, covering 7000 firms) with the price targets of independent
analysts (Value Line data over a longer period—1987-2001—covering
just under 3000 firms). They find that sell-side analysts' return forecasts
increased with the level of the stock market in the late 1990s, while inde-
pendent analysts' forecasts decreased throughout the 1990s. These dis-
crepancies may be caused by honest differences of opinion, by
differences in the horizon of the return forecast (one year for sell-side
analysts, four years for independent analysts), or by the investment
banking ties of sell-side analysts that induced them to tout the stocks of
client companies. Regardless of the source, differences in analysts' opin-
ions might well have led some individual investors to increase their
return expectations in the late 1990s even while other investors were
reducing their expectations.
2. The Distribution of Return Expectations
Although the UBS/Gallup survey is not a panel, there is much that can be
learned from the cross-sectional distribution of return expectations within
each month. Figure 2 in the paper shows that the cross-sectional standard
deviation of return forecasts averages around 10%, comparable to the
cross-sectional mean in Figure 1. Individual investors clearly do not have
homogeneous expectations. In addition, the cross-sectional standard
deviation appears to increase in the late 1990s, peaking in 2000, and then
declines modestly. This pattern would be expected if some investors
reacted to high returns in the late 1990s by increasing their return expec-
tations, in the manner of sell-side analysts, while other investors
decreased their expectations, in the manner of independent analysts.Comment • 197
Figure 2 also shows a great deal of variability in the cross-sectional stan-
dard deviation from month to month, and this tends to obscure the lower-
frequency variation in disagreement. It would be good to know more
about the possible sources of this high-frequency variation in the cross-
sectional standard deviation of return expectations. For example, how
much time-series variation would be expected just from sampling error if
the true cross-sectional standard deviation is constant and 1000 house-
holds are interviewed each month?
The heterogeneity of investors' expectations raises difficult issues when
one tries to summarize the survey results in a single average return expec-
tation. The paper emphasizes an equal-weighted average, sometimes
with an adjustment for the sampling methods used in the survey. This
average, shown in Figure 1, increases in the late 1990s and declines after
2000. For the determination of asset prices, however, a wealth-weighted
average is more relevant because wealthy investors have a much greater
effect on asset demands than poor investors do. Vissing-Jorgensen reports
that wealthy investors, with more than $100,000 in assets, have lower
return expectations throughout the sample period but that their average
expectations have the same time pattern shown in Figure 1.
If investors are constrained from selling shares short, or if they are reluc-
tant to do so, then the most optimistic investors have a disproportionate
influence on prices. The high level of disagreement about future stock
returns throughout the sample, and particularly in 2000, indicates that this
problem is relevant and that a wealth-weighted average return expectation
understates the average demand for stocks by individual investors.
Overall, the UBS/Gallup data suggest that optimism among individual
investors was an important source of demand for stocks in the late 1990s.
This raises the question of why individual investors were so optimistic in
this period.
3. Irrational Extrapolation?
One plausible story is that individuals overreact to their recent past expe-
rience, irrationally extrapolating it into the future. According to this story,
a series of favorable shocks during the 1990s set the stage for a specula-
tive bubble at the end of the decade.
Although the UBS/Gallup survey does not follow investors through
time, it does ask them to report their age, the number of years for which
they have been investing, and their recent past portfolio returns. This fea-
ture of the data allows Vissing-Jorgensen to ask whether investors irra-
tionally extrapolate their own past experience. She argues that if this is the
case, then young and inexperienced investors should be more optimistic198 • CAMPBELL
than older and experienced investors at the market peak because they
place more weight on recent high returns in forming their expectations.
The evidence, reported in Figures 4 and 5, turns out to be mixed. Young
and inexperienced investors do have higher return expectations than do
older and experienced investors at the market peak in 2000, but as the
market falls in 2001 and 2002, the gap in expected returns narrows only
for young investors and not for inexperienced investors.
Vissing-Jorgensen argues that reported past portfolio returns provide
additional evidence of irrational extrapolation. Investors who report high
past portfolio returns also expect higher future returns on the market
(Figure 6), and the effect of past portfolio returns on expectations is
stronger when those past returns are positive (Figure 8). Vissing-Jorgensen
interprets the latter result as evidence for biased self-attribution; the
human tendency to treat past success as meaningful evidence about one's
skill and to treat past failure as random bad luck.
I believe that the results using past portfolio returns should be treated
with caution. A first problem is that past returns are self-reported and
may well reflect an investor's general optimism. A respondent who
receives the UBS/Gallup telephone call when she is in a good mood may
say that her portfolio has been doing well and that the market will do well
in the future, whereas another respondent who is in a bad mood may give
more pessimistic responses. This sort of correlated measurement error
could account for the patterns shown in Figure 6.
A second problem is more subtle. The results shown in Figure 8 are
based on a regression of the following form:
R?t =at+ pfage,-, + yt experience*, + Q1 Rff
+_ 1 + 62R?;_ 1 + uit
Here i denotes an individual respondent and t denotes a time period.
The intercept and the coefficients on age and experience are all time-
varying, but the coefficients on lagged positive portfolio return Rf^ and
lagged negative portfolio return Rfj^ are fixed. The regression is esti-
mated over the period 2000-2002. Figure 8 reflects the fact that Qx is esti-
mated to be large and positive, while G2 is estimated to be small and
negative.
This regression is hard to interpret because past portfolio returns are
not exogenous and are likely to be correlated with other determinants
of return expectations that are omitted from the regression. Also, more
investors had positive past portfolio returns in 2000 than in 2002. Thus,
the separate coefficients on R
F^-i and R
F~t_i may capture a change over
time in the correlation between past portfolio performance and return
expectations, rather than a true structural difference between theComment • 199
effects of positive and negative past returns. The signs of the coeffi-
cients could be explained, for example, if investors are exogenously
optimistic or pessimistic and invest accordingly (optimists invest in
stocks and pessimists invest in Treasury bills). In 2000, optimists had
high past returns and reported high return expectations, while pes-
simists had mediocre past returns and reported low return expecta-
tions, generating a positive coefficient Ql. In 2002, optimists had low
past returns and reported high return expectations, while pessimists
had mediocre past returns and reported low return expectations, gen-
erating a negative coefficient 92.
4. The Limitations of Behavioral Finance
Stepping back from the details of the empirical work in the paper, the dif-
ficulty in interpreting individual investors' optimism at the end of the
1990s illustrates the challenges that face behavioral finance. Compared
with traditional models in financial economics, behavioral models often
have a degree of flexibility that permits reinterpretation to fit new facts.
Such flexibility makes it hard either to disprove or to validate behavioral
models. For example, the theory of biased self-attribution does not make
a clear prediction about individual investors' expectations of returns on
the aggregate stock market. The theory says that investors interpret their
past success as evidence of their skill, but it is not clear why people who
have earned high returns in stocks and believe themselves to be skillful
investors should necessarily expect the stock market to keep rising. They
might just as well switch from one asset class to another in the belief that
they have identified the next new trend.
The lack of theoretical discipline would not be a problem if empirical
research on investor behavior indicated that individual investors are con-
sistently biased in a particular direction. Unfortunately, this is not the
case. While some behavior patterns are consistent with irrational extrap-
olation, others contradict it. Individual investors are keen to put their
money in mutual funds that have performed well recently (Chevalier and
Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998), but they also tend to sell stocks that
have performed well and hold on to those stocks that have performed
badly (the disposition effect of Shefrin and Statman [1985] and Odean
[1998]). While the mutual fund evidence is consistent with irrational
extrapolation, it may also reflect the mechanism by which skillful fund
managers are compensated (Berk and Green, 2002). The disposition effect
is hard to reconcile with either the principles of rational investing or irra-
tional extrapolation. It is sometimes attributed to prospect theory, com-
bined with stock-level mental accounting, but this leaves an open200 • LAMONT
question about the balance between these forces and the opposing force of
irrational extrapolation.
The finance profession has learned a great deal from the detailed and
careful empirical research on investor behavior that has been promoted
by behavioral finance. Vissing-Jorgensen's paper is an excellent example
of this type of research. I do not believe, however, that behavioral finance
has yet been able to offer a coherent theoretical framework comparable to
traditional finance theory. It is better thought of as a set of observed
behaviors, particularly prevalent among individual investors with less
experience and wealth, that can affect asset prices and, just as important,
the financial well-being of these investors. Financial economists should
take such behaviors seriously and should try to use financial education to
reduce their incidence.
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The U.S. stock market has experienced amazing upheaval in the past five
years. Valuations seemed absurdly high in the period 1998-2000, espe-
cially for technology-related stocks. Many previously identified anom-
alies, particularly those relating to new issues, grew larger during the
tech-stock mania episode. Other previously identified patterns relating toComment • 201
scaled prices (that is, price expressed as a ratio such as price/dividend or
price/book value) seemed to go away entirely in the late 1990s, only to
return with a vengeance in 2000-2002. This period will be studied by
financial economists for years to come because it is an extraordinarily
revealing episode full of important clues.
Vissing-Jorgensen discusses some fascinating evidence about this
period, most of it derived from a continuing survey of investors from
1998-2002. Like all data, this data has limitations. First, all survey data
should be regarded with skepticism and this type of survey more than
most (I discuss this point further below). Second, it is a real shame this
dataset starts in 1998 and does not include more of the pre-mania period.
Despite these limitations, the data reveal many interesting facts that are
useful for sorting out different hypotheses about the tech-stock mania.
Vissing-Jorgensen has done a great job in revealing the features of the
data, taking what was undoubtedly a complicated and demanding task
and making it look easy. There are many different ways this data could
have been used, and I am convinced that the graphs, regressions, and sta-
tistical tests are accurately telling us what we need to know. Vissing-
Jorgensen does many different things in the paper, but I am going to focus
only on the main survey results and interpret them from my own per-
spective of what the tech-stock mania period was about.
1. Limitations of Survey Data
To me, survey data about expectations and beliefs is one of the weakest
forms of data, just one rung above anecdotes in the quality ladder. I think
we should always be suspicious of survey data on beliefs, especially
involving abstract and intangible concepts (such as expected stock
returns) that are unfamiliar to the respondents. This data is most useful
when it is possible to cross-verify with data on actual (not self-reported)
behavior observed by objective external measurement. I see survey evi-
dence of this type as suggestive, but not definitive.
Fortunately, there is ample cross-verification for many of the patterns
documented in the paper. For example, Figure 8 shows striking evidence
for biased self-attribution (individuals believe good performance is due to
their skill, but bad performance is due to luck). The fact that the perform-
ance is self-reported makes interpreting the results problematic.
Fortunately, other evidence documents biased self-attribution. Barber and
Odean (2002) document, using actual portfolio performance and actual
trading, that investors who have done well in the past tend to increase
their trading, consistent with the hypothesis that they believe themselves
to be more skillful.202 • LAMONT
Having stated these reservations, let me say that I find nothing at all
implausible in the results shown. They seem revealing about what was
going through people's minds in real time. This survey is also potentially
more reliable than surveys involving analyst expectations because these
analysts have their own problems (most notably a pronounced optimistic
bias).
2. Aggregate Expected Returns
There are three possible explanations for why the aggregate market was
so extraordinarily high in the tech-stock mania period. The first explana-
tion is the honest mistake hypothesis: investors believed that future prof-
its would be extraordinarily high and set prices accordingly. As it turns
out, this high-profit scenario did not occur, but perhaps at that time it was
reasonable to forecast high profits. According to the honest mistake
hypothesis, there is no special reason to think that investors believed that
expected returns were either particularly high or particularly low in, say,
March 2000. The honest mistake hypothesis appears to be the preferred
explanation for true believers in the efficient market hypothesis.
The second explanation is the low expected return hypothesis. Under
this hypothesis, everyone knew expected equity returns had fallen, but
they were happy to hold stocks despite their lower returns. At the time,
some asserted that the equity premium had fallen for various reasons: the
increasingly broad ownership of stocks, lower economic risk, higher risk
tolerance, more institutions to share risk, and demographic changes. The
low expected return hypothesis is a bit shakier on explaining the dramatic
fall in stock prices from 2000 to 2002, but perhaps for some reason the
equity premium rose again. Like the honest mistake hypothesis, the low
expected return hypothesis is consistent with frictionless efficient markets.
The third explanation is overpricing: investors set prices too high,
either knowingly or unknowingly, and this overpricing was obvious to
some set of rational and informed investors at the time. One particular
version of the overpricing hypothesis is that some optimistic investors
extrapolated returns into the future, not realizing that the market was
overvalued. It could also be that many investors knew the market was over-
priced but chose to buy stocks anyway. In either case, because mispricing
is eventually corrected, the overpricing hypothesis predicts that when
stocks are overpriced, subsequent long-term returns will be low as the
correction takes place, which is exactly what happened.
Figure 1 refutes the low expected return hypothesis and also casts sub-
stantial doubt on the honest mistake hypothesis. Reported expected one-
year returns were wildly optimistic in early 2000 and fell sharply in 2001Comment • 203
and 2002. This is exactly the opposite pattern required for the low
expected return hypothesis. In reality investors reported expectations
were undoubtedly simply chasing past returns. This pattern is confirmed
by a strong pattern in mutual fund flows: inflows also chase past returns.
This return-chasing pattern occurs both in the cross section (top funds
have big inflows) and in the time series (all stock funds have inflows
when the stock market has done well). Indeed, one piece of confirming
evidence for Figure 1 is that net flows to stock funds during this period
roughly match the pattern of reported expected returns. In summary
naive adaptive expectations appear to be an accurate model for many
investors.
The honest mistake hypothesis takes another hit in Figure 3, which
shows in early 2000 that about 50% of the respondents thought the mar-
ket was overvalued, while less than 10% thought it was undervalued. If
pessimists outnumber optimists by 5 to 1, that does not sound like an hon-
est mistake. It sounds like many knew the market was too high, but for
some reason they went along with the ride.
3. Heterogeneous Expectations and Short Sale Constraints
One of the most important contributions of the paper is its examination of
differences of opinion among investors. Heterogeneity is an increasingly
important topic in asset pricing as well as in macroeconomics (see the
paper by Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers in this volume, for example).
Combined with short sale constraints, differences of opinion can create
overpricing. Short sale constraints are anything that inhibits investors
from short selling securities; in the case of tech-stock mania, the main con-
straint was probably that pessimists thought that shorting tech stocks was
too risky. In Figure 1, it is clear in hindsight that NASDAQ was too high
at 3000 in 1999. But anyone shorting NASDAQ then would have suffered
severe losses as NASDAQ went to 5000 in March 2000. As hedge fund
manager Cliff Asness has commented about short sale constraints, "Our
problem wasn't that we couldn't short NASDAQ in 1999, our problem
was that we could and did."
As Miller (1977) pointed out, with short sale constraints, stock prices
reflect only the views of the optimists. Thus, differences of opinion plus
short sale constraints can lead to overpricing. Now, one reason opinions
may differ is that some investors are irrationally optimistic—this is what
I would call the behavioral finance explanation, and there is substantial
evidence to support this view of tech-stock mania. However, Harrison
and Kreps (1978) showed that even when all investors are rational but
have different beliefs, overpricing can occur. Let me give an example of204 • LAMONT
the Harrison and Kreps (1978) story. A remarkable property of this exam-
ple, and one that fits well with the evidence given in the paper, is that
everybody agrees that stocks are overpriced but they are still willing to
hold stocks.
Suppose investor A and investor B have different beliefs about the
prospects for the level of NASDAQ. Each investor knows what the other
one believes, but they agree to disagree, so there is no asymmetric infor-
mation. Now, it is a controversial issue in economic theory whether
rational agents can agree to disagree, but let's leave that aside. Assume a
simple setup with three dates, date 0, date 1, and date 2. For simplicity
assume risk-neutral agents behaving competitively and a discount rate of
zero. Assume also that there are sufficient numbers of type A and type B
investors for each type to hold all of NASDAQ by themselves. Suppose
it is currently date 0 and both investor A and investor B believe that
NASDAQ is worth 2000 today. Specifically, they both believe that at
date 2 it will be at 3000 with 50% probability and at 1000 with 50%
probability. However, investor A thinks that at date 1, some news will
arrive that will resolve all uncertainty, while investor B thinks there will
be no relevant news released until date 2. This belief about the timing of
news is the only disagreement between investor A and investor B (it is not
necessary to state who, if either, is right in their beliefs). The Harrison and
Kreps (1978) model has the remarkable property that, in the presence of
short sale constraints, both investor A and investor B would be willing to
hold NASDAQ at 2500 at date 0, despite the fact that they both think it is
worth only 2000.
To get to this result, work backward from date 1, using the principle
that with short sale constraints the optimist always sets the price. At date
1, if good news has arrived, then investor A will value NASDAQ at 3000,
while investor B still thinks it is worth 2000; thus, the price will be 3000,
investor A will hold all the asset, and investor B will hold none of it. If bad
news arrives at date 1, the price will be 2000 and investor B will hold all
of it. Because these two states happen with 50-50 probability, the date 0
expected price for date 1 is 2500. Thus at date 0, both investor A and
investor B are willing to hold NASDAQ at a price of 2500. Although
everyone thinks it is overvalued at date 0, they are willing to buy at date
0 because they believe they are following a dynamic trading strategy that
will take advantage of the other guy. This example formalizes the notion
of the greater fool theory of asset pricing. Note that, in this example,
everyone agrees that long-term expected returns between date 0 and date
2 are low, and that a buy-and-hold strategy is a bad idea. If surveyed at
date 0, both investor A and investor B would say that NASDAQ was over-
valued relative to date 2 but fairly valued relative to date 1.Comment • 205
Key predictions of this story are that overpricing is highest when dif-
ferences of opinion are highest, everyone agrees that prices are too high,
and trading volume is high because everyone is following dynamic trad-
ing strategies. Vissing-Jorgensen's evidence supports the first two predic-
tions. Figure 2 shows disagreement peaked in early 2000, around the time
when stock prices peaked. Figure 1 shows that the majority of those who
had an opinion about the market thought it was overvalued. The third
prediction, about volume, is also supported by the events during this
period. Not only did tech stocks have high prices, they also had very high
volume. Volume on NASDAQ more than doubled between January 1999
and its peak in January 2001. Volume certainly seems like a key part of the
tech-stock mania story, and one that the honest mistake and low expected
return hypotheses cannot explain.
Another fact explained by the overpricing hypothesis is the high level
of stock issuance that occurred in 1998-2000. One interpretation is that
issuers and underwriters knew that stocks were overpriced and so rushed
to issue. Although Vissing-Jorgensen's survey does not include issuers,
evidence arising out of subsequent legal action against underwriters
(such as emails sent by investment-bank employees) is certainly consis-
tent with the hypothesis that the underwriters thought the market was
putting too high a value on new issues. One way to think about issuance
is as a mechanism for overcoming short sale constraints. Both short sell-
ing and issuance have the effect of increasing the amount of stock that the
optimists can buy; both are examples of supply increasing in response to
high prices. Suppose you think lamont.com is overpriced in 1999. One
way to take advantage of this fact is to short the stock. In doing so, you
are selling overpriced shares to optimists. This action is risky, however,
because lamont.com might well double in price. A safer alternative action
is for you to start a new company that competes with lamont.com, call it
Iamont2.com, and issue stock. This issue is another way to sell overpriced
shares to optimists.
4. Sources of Heterogeneity
Why might differences of opinion be more pronounced in 1998-2000 than
at other times? Miller (1977) presciently lists many of the characteristics
that lead to differences of opinion. The first is that the firm has a short
track record or has intangible prospects: "The divergence of opinion
about a new issue are greatest when the stock is issued. Frequently the
company has not started operations, or there is uncertainty about the suc-
cess of new products or the profitability of a major business expansion"
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The second is that the company has high visibility, so that there are
many optimists: "Some companies are naturally well known because
their products are widely advertised and widely consumed.... Of course,
the awareness of a security may be increased if the issuing company
receives much publicity. For instance, new products and technological
breakthroughs are news so that companies producing such products
receive more publicity" (p. 1165).
Tech stocks certainly fit both these criteria. Stocks like Amazon or
AOL were familiar to the investing classes who used them, but unlike
other familiar products (such as Coca-Cola), they had a short operat-
ing history, so that optimists could construct castles in the sky with-
out fear of contradiction by fact. Vissing-Jorgensen reports survey
data on Internet use that seems to fit this story. Those who used the
Internet thought Internet stocks had higher expected returns than
other stocks, and they were more likely to include Internet stocks in
their portfolio.
Vissing-Jorgensen also documents another interesting fact: young
investors expected higher returns than older (and wiser) investors. This
fact illustrates another key principle of behavioral finance: there's a
sucker born every minute. Folk wisdom on Wall Street often claims that
overvaluation occurs when young and inexperienced investors (who did
not live through the last bear market) come to dominate. Apparently there
is some truth to this claim.
5. Conclusion
We need to understand the events of 1998-2002 if we are to have any
hope of understanding how stock markets work. Economists have
expended a lot of effort studying episodes such as the stock market crash
of 1987, the crash of 1929, and various alleged bubbles such as tulip
mania. We are fortunate that this particular episode is well documented.
Any satisfactory explanation will need to explain the high level of prices,
the high level of volume, the high level of stock issuance, and the forces
that prevented pessimists from correcting prices. Vissing-Jorgensen's
paper is a good first step in arriving at an explanation. Her results sug-
gest to me that tech stocks were indeed identifiably overpriced in the
tech-stock mania period.
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Discussion
Annette Vissing-Jorgensen agreed with the discussants that data reliabil-
ity is an issue. However, she mentioned several pieces of evidence to sup-
port the fact that responses in the survey are not entirely noise. For
example, respondents with higher market expectations put more in stocks
than those with lower market expectations. Vissing-Jorgensen also
suggested that the reliability of the survey data could be examined by
looking at the length of time respondents took to complete the survey.
Rick Mishkin expanded on the comments of Owen Lamont about the
structure of investment banking and the stock market bubble. He noted
that bubbles occur when there is nonfundamental pricing of assets, but
that this nonfundamental pricing can in fact be driven by institutions. He
held that the U.S. stock market bubble of the 1990s was driven in part by
a conflict of interest in investment banking between advice and sales. He
mentioned that in Scandinavia and Japan, a combination of financial lib-
eralization, government safety nets for the financial system, and poor pru-
dential supervision had led to real estate bubbles. He recommended that
policymakers should focus on institutions and regulation to understand
and learn how to prevent bubbles. On this issue, Vissing-Jorgensen noted
that the datasets described by John Campbell could be used to examine
how price movements subsequent to earnings announcements depend on
the independence of the analysts concerned.
Annamaria Lusardi was concerned by the implications of the paper's
findings on the speed of learning for wealth accumulation. She speculated
that the consequences for retirement savings could be substantial if
investors do indeed learn very slowly. Vissing-Jorgensen responded that
the fact that payoffs increase with wealth could be explained by costs of
obtaining information. She noted that if this were indeed the case, it
would suggest a role for investor education.
Mark Gertler was curious about whether survey respondents could be
distinguished by frequency of trading. He pointed out that investors who
adopt buy-and-hold strategies have less of an incentive to pay attention
to the market and hence might have beliefs determined by outdated208 • DISCUSSION
information. Vissing-Jorgensen said that it might be possible to perform
this exercise eventually.
Kjetil Storesletten questioned the suggestion that short sale constraints
could explain investor underperformance. He noted that if two-thirds of
people expect the market to fall, there should be a substantial demand
for short sales, and that this should lead to financial innovation. He sug-
gested that it might not have been clear to investors at the time that there
was a bubble. Vissing-Jorgensen responded that investors might not
have been comfortable shorting the market because they thought that it
would continue to go up before going down. She said that the bigger
question was, Why are investor horizons so short? Owen Lamont com-
mented that, for whatever reason, there are very few institutions allow-
ing investors to go short. His view was that there was little demand for
such institutions because psychological constraints made people reluc-
tant to take negative positions, although they were quite happy to take
zero positions.
Eva Nagypal was curious about how savings rates correlated with
investor performance and behavior. Vissing-Jorgensen responded that
those expecting high portfolio returns, i.e., of at least 20%, did save more
but that otherwise there was no correlation between performance and
savings.